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ARTICLE 
CAPITAL RIGIDITIES, LATENT 
EXTERNALITIES 
Shi-Ling Hsu* 
ABSTRACT 
Capital, one of two fundamental inputs to production, is 
critical to economic growth. As such, legal rules and institutions 
generally seek to create more of it, and they also seek to protect 
existing capital from policy changes. However, capital is often 
durable, and during its natural life, information may emerge 
pointing to negative externalities resulting from operation of that 
capital. Legal rules and institutions, in seeking to stimulate and 
sustain economic growth by promoting and protecting capital, 
thus tend to induce the creation of excess capital. This 
abundance of capital creates excess resistance to new regulation 
or policy reform, as capital owners will have a larger capital 
stake to defend and will expend more resources to resist changes 
in their legal and economic environment. 
This theory of capital has special application to 
environmental externalities, which are commonly latent. Capital 
is thus almost always obtained with incomplete information 
about potential environmental externalities. Environmental law 
is the means by which many previously unforeseen externalities 
are sought to be addressed, but any change in environmental law 
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is invariably challenged by capital owners. By enacting legal 
rules to promote and protect capital, developed societies have 
unwittingly erected larger barriers to environmental reform. 
Over time, environmental law has become more difficult to 
reform and the source of more litigation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Capital is good. Capital and labor are the two stylized inputs 
to production.1 Among economists, capital is universally regarded 
                                                     
 1. The Cobb–Douglas production function, which every economics student 
learns about in undergraduate economics, posits production as a function of the 
quantity and productivity of just two types of inputs: labor and capital. See generally 
Gerald Beer, The Cobb–Douglas Production Function, 53 MATHEMATICS MAG. 44, 44–
45 (1980) (describing how the function is commonly featured in economics and even 
calculus texts); Charles W. Cobb & Paul H. Douglas, A Theory of Production, 18 AM. 
ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 151–59 (Supp. 1928) (deriving and discussing the 
formula); Paul H. Douglas, The Cobb–Douglas Production Function Once Again: Its 
History, Its Testing, and Some New Empirical Values, 84 J. POL. ECON. 903, 903–04 
(1976) (discussing the inputs of labor and capital within the Cobb–Douglas formula). 
The now-familiar Cobb–Douglas formulation, Y = ALαKβ, with Y representing output, 
L representing labor, and K representing capital, is a foundational relation in 
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as positively related to economic growth.2 If one asks (as 
numerous economists have asked) the complicated question of 
why some countries are so much richer and produce so much 
more than others,3 one can easily rule out the availability of labor 
as a limiting input because most developing countries are awash 
in cheap labor.4 What is left? Capital.5 Furthermore, more capital 
is always better. Additional capital may or may not be worth its 
cost, but it never decreases productivity.6 
Capital is good, except when it isn’t. After capital is 
acquired, new information may emerge suggesting that the 
                                                     
economic theory. Beer, supra, at 44–45 (describing how output can be modeled by this 
well-regarded function). 
 2. Robert Solow’s fundamental neoclassical growth model posits growth as a 
general function of labor, capital, and technology, the latter being a multiplier that makes 
the other two inputs more productive. Robert M. Solow, A Contribution to the Theory of 
Economic Growth, 70 Q.J. ECON. 65, 66, 85 (1956); see also W. KIP VISCUSI, JOSEPH E. 
HARRINGTON, JR. & JOHN M. VERNON, ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 93 (4th 
ed. 2005) (emphasizing Solow’s conclusion regarding the relative importance of technology 
to output); George N. Hatsopoulos, Paul R. Krugman & Lawrence H. Summers, U.S. 
Competitiveness: Beyond the Trade Deficit, 241 SCIENCE 299, 299, 301–02 (1988) (arguing 
for a broader definition of capital to explain relative American lagging in productivity 
growth); N. Gregory Mankiw, The Growth of Nations, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. 
ACTIVITY, no. 1, 1995, at 275, 292, 308 (explaining the positive externalities to capital). 
 3. See, e.g., Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr. & Ola Olsson, Geography, Biogeography, and 
Why Some Countries Are Rich and Others Are Poor, 101 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 3715, 
3715 (2004) (“The prosperity of nations varies enormously. . . . How can this large 
variation in the wealth of nations be explained?”); Mathias Risse, What We Owe to the 
Global Poor, 9 J. ETHICS 81, 83 (2005) (tracing the question back to Adam Smith’s Wealth 
of Nations). 
 4. See, e.g., Michael P. Todaro, A Model of Labor Migration and Urban 
Unemployment in Less Developed Countries, 59 AM. ECON. REV. 138, 138–39 (1969) 
(“[E]ven the most casual observer of these countries cannot help but be overwhelmed by 
the proportion of the urban labor force which is apparently untouched by the so-called 
‘modern’ economy.”); Adrian Wood, Openness and Wage Inequality in Developing 
Countries: The Latin American Challenge to East Asian Conventional Wisdom, 11 WORLD 
BANK ECON. REV. 33, 34 (1997) (“The belief that increased openness reduces wage 
inequality in developing countries rests on an apparently indisputable fact—that the 
supply of unskilled labor, relative to the supply of skilled labor, is larger in developing 
than in developed countries . . . .”). 
 5. Also, technology, which in the Cobb–Douglas and Solow formulations acts as a 
multiplier for labor productivity and capital productivity, is not considered an input for 
productivity. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, A Model of Innovation, Technology Transfer, and 
the World Distribution of Income, 87 J. POL. ECON. 253, 254–55, 259 (1979) (developing a 
model with labor as the only factor of production, while including technical progress only 
in the form of the availability of new products, rather than an increased volume of 
production of old products); Richard R. Nelson & Edmund S. Phelps, Investment in 
Humans, Technological Diffusion, and Economic Growth, 56 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & 
PROC.) 69, 71 (1966) (“[T]echnical progress is Harrod-neutral everywhere (i.e., for all 
capital-labor ratios), so that progress can be described as purely labor-augmenting.”). 
 6. Idiosyncratic exceptions may exist, but the Cobb–Douglas production function is 
almost never deployed with capital having an inverse relationship with productivity. See 
Beer, supra note 1, at 45 (describing the function as concave such that as long as there is 
input, output will increase, even if at a decreasing rate). 
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capital might not be so useful after all.7 The new information 
may reveal some harmful effects of operating that capital or 
indicate that continued employment of that capital produces net 
social harms. Or, the new information may suggest that capital is 
outdated, and that other forms of capital or other technologies 
would be more efficient and produce greater net social benefits. 
In short, new information can render existing capital obsolete in 
a number of different ways, most notably by revealing the 
presence of latent negative externalities.8 But even obsolete 
capital can be extremely difficult to dislodge.9 Unless obsolete 
capital can be profitably redeployed, attempts to regulate or 
internalize externalities10 resulting from the operation of capital 
will be vigorously opposed by its owners.11 
This theory of capital has special application to 
environmental externalities, which are by their nature commonly 
latent. The most serious environmental problems are no longer 
obvious and visceral.12 Leaky industrial drums sitting atop 
                                                     
 7. SHI-LING HSU, THE CASE FOR A CARBON TAX: GETTING PAST OUR HANG-UPS TO 
EFFECTIVE CLIMATE POLICY 41, 43 (2011) (“[T]he problem with mandating an expensive 
environmental technology is the economic irreversibility of capital expenditures.”); 
Clayton Christensen, Thomas Craig & Stuart Hart, The Great Disruption, FOREIGN AFF., 
Mar./Apr. 2001, at 80, 81–82 (describing disruptive technologies—“cheaper, simpler, and 
more convenient products or services”—and the challenges these technologies pose for 
companies). 
 8. See Christensen, Craig & Hart, supra note 7, at 81–85 (discussing the effect of 
“disruptive technologies”—a form of new information—on existing industries, noting that 
these technologies “have plunged many of history’s best companies into crisis and, 
ultimately, failure”). 
 9. See id. at 88–89 (contrasting the American economy’s success at repeating the 
cycle of starting new companies that create disruptive growth disruption against the 
Japanese economy’s failure to develop a venture-capital infrastructure); infra Part III.B 
(explaining how the redeployment of capital is difficult due, in part, to switching costs). 
 10. An externality is a general term for an effect of a decision, on a party other than 
the decision-maker, that the decision-maker does not take into account. For a discussion, 
see Carl J. Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J.L. & ECON. 141, 147 (1979), which 
discusses the transaction costs of externalities. “The conventional view of externalities, 
whether associated with socially undesirable or desirable activities, is that externalities 
arise as the unintended byproduct of otherwise self-serving activities.” Daniel B. Kelly, 
Strategic Spillovers, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1649–51 (2011). 
 11. See C. Edwin Baker, An Economic Critique of Free Trade in Media Products, 78 
N.C. L. REV. 1357, 1418–19 (2000) (“For the firm, even if externalities reflect real 
preferences that people theoretically are willing to pay to satisfy, as long as they are 
externalities . . . these preferences are not brought to bear on the firm’s decisions, usually 
because of transaction costs or collective action problems. Externalities are irrelevant 
because they fall into neither the firm’s expense nor revenue column.”); infra Part III.B 
(examining how overcapitalization creates resistance to policy reform). 
 12. See, e.g., JACK C. BENDER, THE DUTY TO DISCLOSE LATENT ENVIRONMENTAL 
HAZARDS IN MINERAL PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS § 2.01 (1994), available at 
http://www.emlf.org/clientuploads/directory/whitepaper/Bender_94.pdf (noting that many 
environmental externalities of mineral extraction activities are “hidden and would not be 
discovered or anticipated through visual inspection of the property”); Environmental 
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playgrounds are no longer the symbol of environmental blight. 
The focus of environmental law has turned towards less visible 
problems, such as the emission of carbon dioxide causing global 
climate change,13 and the emission of fine particulate matter—
less than 2.5 microns in diameter—quietly causing millions of 
premature deaths annually.14 But these kinds of environmental 
problems only become apparent after decades of careful and 
credible research.15 In the meantime, billions of dollars of capital 
may accumulate without any serious attempt to consider the 
possibility of latent externalities. 
Reform or new legislation leading to resolution of modern 
environmental problems has thus been elusive well before 
Congress reached its current state of gridlock.16 Congress has not 
passed a new federal environmental statute since 199017 despite 
                                                     
Effects of Acid Rain, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/region1/eco/acidrain/enveffects.html (last 
updated Sept. 19, 2013) (discussing some of the more “subtle” effects of acid rain). 
 13. For a relatively brief treatment of this extremely broad, complex, and literature-
heavy problem, see generally ROBERT HENSON, THE ROUGH GUIDE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 
(1st ed. 2006). 
 14. An extremely sophisticated body of epidemiological research has emerged over 
decades of careful research linking concentrations of fine particulate matter with 
premature mortalities. See, e.g., Francine Laden et al., Reduction in Fine Particulate Air 
Pollution and Mortality: Extended Follow-up of the Harvard Six Cities Study, 173 AM. J. 
RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL CARE MED. 667, 667–69 & tbl.1 (2006) (finding an increase in 
overall mortality associated with each 10-µg/m3 increase in fine particulate matter 
pollution); Johanna Lepeule et al., Chronic Exposure to Fine Particles and Mortality: An 
Extended Follow-up of the Harvard Six Cities Study from 1974 to 2009, 120 ENVTL. 
HEALTH PERSP. 965, 968 (2012) (finding evidence that exposure to fine particulate matter 
can lead to early mortality); C. Arden Pope III et al., Lung Cancer, Cardiopulmonary 
Mortality, and Long-term Exposure to Fine Particulate Air Pollution, 287 JAMA 1132, 
1136 & tbl.2 (2002) (finding that exposure to fine particulate matter is associated with all-
cause, cardiopulmonary, and lung cancer mortality). Recent studies have estimated that 
fine particulate matter pollution causes over two million premature deaths annually, 
Raquel A. Silva et al., Global Premature Mortality Due to Anthropogenic Outdoor Air 
Pollution and the Contribution of Past Climate Change, ENVTL. RES. LETTERS, July–Sept. 
2013, at 1, 4, and 1.2 million deaths in China alone, Edward Wong, Early Deaths Linked 
to China’s Air Pollution Totaled 1.2 Million in 2010, Data Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 
2013, at A9. 
 15. See, e.g., Lepeule et al., supra note 14, at 965, 968 (describing how research 
regarding the health impact of fine particulate matter utilized data gathered by Harvard 
from 1974 to 1977 and 1979 to 2009). 
 16. Jonathan H. Adler, Conservative Principles for Environmental Reform, 23 DUKE 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 253, 253 (2013) (arguing that major reform is necessary because only 
minor bills have passed since the Clean Air Act in 1990). 
 17. This Author considers the last significant federal environmental legislation 
passed by Congress to be the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 
104 Stat. 2399 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006)). See also Barton 
H. Thompson, Jr., A Federal Act to Promote Integrated Water Management: Is the CZMA a 
Useful Model?, 42 ENVTL. L. 201, 203 & n.10 (2012) (“Congress has passed neither major 
new environmental legislation nor significant water reform measures for almost two 
decades.”). 
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the existence of a number of under-regulated industries.18 
Prevailing explanations for this inertia in these areas of law fall 
broadly into three categories: (i) public choice explanations;19 
(ii) framing problems;20 and (iii) doubts about the importance of 
the underlying problem.21 While all of these explanations have 
                                                     
 18. Nicholas Z. Muller, Robert Mendelsohn & William Nordhaus, Environmental 
Accounting for Pollution in the United States Economy, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 1649, 1665 
(2011) (highlighting seven industries which are not efficiently regulated). Whether certain 
industries and industrial practices are truly more harmful than productive is of course a 
challenging question to answer, but an important recent analysis suggests good reason to 
suspect there are many such industries. Id. at 1664–65. Using integrated assessment 
models, which model environmental and economic impacts together, Muller, Mendelsohn, 
and Nordhaus created an analysis of the net gross external damages of all point-source 
polluters of all pollutants in the United States and found that their best estimates of 
gross external damages of seven industries exceed their contribution to economic activity. 
Id. at 1659, 1664–65. Those industries are solid waste combustion, stone mining and 
quarrying, sewage treatment, oil- and coal-fired power generation, marinas, and 
petroleum and coal products. Id. at 1665. Given the somewhat restrictive assumptions in 
this study about, for example, nonmarket damages to ecological systems, one suspects 
that there are many more than seven industries that are more harmful than valuable. Id. 
at 1654, 1667, 1672–73. 
 19. For example, one common public choice explanation is that intensely affected 
regulated industries are more motivated to resist reform than lightly affected and widely 
dispersed majorities are to advance reform. See Gebhard Kirchgässner & Friedrich 
Schneider, On the Political Economy of Environmental Policy, 115 PUB. CHOICE 369, 373, 
377 (2003) (describing how industries burdened by environmental regulations are opposed 
to the use of economic instruments). If that is the case, then one might expect the politics 
of policy change to favor inertia. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE 
CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 18, 21–
22, 29 (1962) (assuming actors will “choose ‘more’ rather than ‘less’ when confronted with 
the opportunity for choice in a political process,” when “more” advances their economic 
position); see also George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. 
& MGMT. SCI. 3, 12 (1971) (discussing the high costs of legislative reform and stating that 
“[t]he smallest industries are . . . effectively precluded from the political process”). 
Another public choice explanation might be that agency actors and the industries they 
regulate will have repeat interactions. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE 
REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 54–55 (1992) (comparing this 
repeat interaction to a multiperiod prisoner’s dilemma game). If that is the case, then one 
would expect patterns of cooperation which might, in the face of policy change, give rise to 
a systemic resistance to change, lest that upset a status quo that benefits both regulator 
and regulated industry. See id. (discussing how the conditions that encourage cooperation 
can also encourage capture and corruption). 
 20. For example, within the category of framing problems, one explanation could be 
that the costs of environmental policy are more easily identified and visualized than the 
environmental benefits, which tend to take on statistical forms. Shi-Ling Hsu, The 
Identifiability Bias in Environmental Law, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 433, 440, 443–44 (2008) 
(describing the statistical links between air pollution and health problems as “weak 
attractors of sympathy”). 
 21. There are obviously conflicting accounts of whether the science of climate 
change is sufficient or not, but most informed observers of the climate change debate 
would agree that the risk of inaction is unjustifiable. A summary of the controversy can be 
found in Shi-Ling Hsu, A Prediction Market for Climate Outcomes, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 
179, 181–89 (2011) (explaining how the distrustful general public has an “inflated 
perception of the extent of disagreement among climate scientists”). 
Do Not Delete  2/9/2014  4:51 PM 
2014] CAPITAL RIGIDITIES 725 
some explanatory power, a theory of how capital impedes energy 
and environmental policy reform is the most broadly applicable. 
This Article sets forth a theory that is more specific than most 
public choice explanations and broader than most psychological 
explanations. Just about every proposed reform to address a 
latent environmental problem has emerged in the middle of the 
economic life of some form of capital and posed a threat to some 
individual, firm, or industry that had capital invested in the 
status quo.22 Every proposed reform of significance creates losers; 
this Article explains how they lose and how much they will resist 
losing. If the continued exploitation of capital creates latent 
externalities that were not appreciated (or were consciously 
ignored) at its time of formation, a split in interests emerges: 
cessation of use of the capital may be desirable from the social 
point of view, but the owner of the capital will want to continue 
to use the capital. This simple story is, in part, the story of 
almost every latent externality ever created. 
A particularly salient example of this dynamic revolves 
around coal-fired electricity generation. Long-lived industrial 
capital such as coal-fired power plants played an important role 
in generating wealth throughout the world by providing low-cost 
electricity.23 The low costs were made possible by abundant 
supplies of coal that could be extracted at relatively low costs.24 
Thousands of coal-fired power plants were built, and a vast 
extraction and distribution network was created to mine coal and 
deliver it to these power plants.25 Over time, however, a great 
deal of information has emerged suggesting that although the 
private costs of mining and burning coal are low, these direct 
costs are swamped by the social and environmental costs of coal 
mining and combustion.26 Also, new technologies and new 
                                                     
 22. See infra note 100 and accompanying text (explaining that reform will only take 
place when capital assets have “remaining life”).  
 23. For a general history of coal, see generally BARBARA FREESE, COAL: A HUMAN 
HISTORY (2003). 
 24. Id. at 6–7; Sean Patrick Adams, The US Coal Industry in the Nineteenth 
Century, ECON. HISTORY ASS’N, http://www.eh.net/encyclopedia/the-us-coal-industry-in-
the-nineteenth-century-2/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2014) (describing coal in the nineteenth 
century as “cheap and efficient” and detailing the innovations in coal mining that 
facilitated extraction). 
 25. FREESE, supra note 23, at 118–26. 
 26. Epidemiological work undertaken over decades has shown that by far, the 
greatest cost of coal combustion is in the human toll of premature deaths occurring due to 
fine particulate matter emissions. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing 
research linking concentrations of fine particulate matter to premature mortalities). For 
an estimate of the total damages from coal combustion, see Roberta Mann, Another Day 
Older and Deeper in Debt: How Tax Incentives Encourage Burning Coal and the 
Consequences for Global Warming, 20 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 111, 
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sources of energy (most prominently natural gas) have emerged 
suggesting that coal is not even the cheapest fossil fuel for 
generating electricity.27 But the sprawling network of coal 
production, distribution, and combustion is fixed. It cannot be 
easily redeployed in a low-carbon economy.28 This capital rigidity 
has created a huge number of parties with a tremendous stake in 
its continued existence.29 
This Article sets out a theory of capital that explains how 
legal rules and institutions create resistance to reform, especially 
attempts to address environmental externalities. Part II of this 
Article sets out a working definition of the term “capital.” This 
Part also briefly describes the three different types of capital 
considered in this Article: physical, human, and social capital. 
Part III of this Article sets out examples of how capital impedes 
reform attempting to address latent externalities. Part IV 
                                                     
118–25 (2007) (listing external costs on society resulting from the use of coal, including 
worker accidents, acid precipitation, and loss of topsoil); Muller, Mendelsohn & Nordhaus, 
supra note 18, at 1661, 1665 tbl.2 (discussing the Laden et al. study and showing, using 
integrated assessment economic models, external damages of $53.4 billion, which is 2.2 
times greater than the value added by coal-fired electricity generation). 
 27. See Electricity from Non-Hydroelectric Renewable Energy Sources, U.S. ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy-and-you/affect/non-hydro.html 
(last updated Sept. 25, 2013) (describing how biomass is better for the environment than 
burning coal). Natural gas has long been known to be less polluting than coal and, at least 
in the environmental sense, a superior fossil fuel. See Electricity from Natural Gas, U.S. 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy-and-you/affect/natural-
gas.html (last updated Sept. 25, 2013). More recently, the emergence of hydraulic 
fracturing technology has rendered natural gas inexpensive enough to rival coal as the 
fuel of choice for electricity generating firms. See, e.g., Electric Power Monthly, U.S. 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY (Sept. 20, 2013), 
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/epm_table_grapher.cfm?t=epmt_1_01 (showing net 
generation from natural gas approaching that of coal); Ken Silverstein, Obama Trying to 
Escape Political Fallout from Natural Gas Fracking Proposals, FORBES (Sept. 6, 2013), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kensilverstein/2013/09/06/obama-trying-to-escape-political-
fallout-from-natural-gas-fracking-proposals/ (describing how the Obama administration 
discourages coal-fired power plants and encourages natural gas, which is easier to access 
due to hydraulic fracturing, or “fracking”). 
 28. Coal-fired power plants can be converted to natural-gas-fired power plants, but 
the conversion is usually too costly and burdensome. See, e.g., ERIC WILLIAMS ET AL., 
CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY P’SHIP, DUKE UNIV., A CONVENIENT GUIDE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 
POLICY AND TECHNOLOGY 37, 39–40 (2007), available at http://www.nicholas.duke.edu/ 
ccpp/convenientguide/PDFs/ClimateBook.pdf (giving examples of coal-fired power plants 
that have been “repowered,” but conceding that “retiring all coal-fired power plants and 
replacing them with less carbon-intensive plants is not economically or politically 
feasible”); Daniel Cusick, Study: Switch From Coal to Gas Poses Some Risks for Utilities, 
MIDWEST ENERGY NEWS (Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.midwestenergynews.com/2013/09/ 
12/study-converting-coal-to-gas-poses-some-risks-for-utilities/ (describing how 
investments in conversion of a plant are risky due to the uncertain future of the energy 
market, particularly the impact of regulations). 
 29. See infra Part IV.B (discussing how further capital formation in the mining 
industry would thwart much-needed policy reform). 
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explains how current laws and governmental structures either 
overpromote the formation of capital or overprotect it once it is 
formed or acquired. Part V argues for a refocusing of government 
subsidies on true public goods. Specifically, this Part argues that 
government policy should focus more on network goods, and not 
just on capital projects that lower commodity prices. This Article 
then concludes with some general observations on laws affecting 
the formation and protection of capital. 
II.  WHAT IS CAPITAL? 
The term “capital” has an almost universally positive 
connotation.30 A fair amount of government policy seems to be 
oriented toward promoting the formation and acquisition of 
capital. Scattered liberally throughout the Internal Revenue 
Code are generous provisions to assist with the formation and 
acquisition of capital,31 especially for small businesses.32 
President Obama’s economic stimulus packages of 2008 and 2009 
included temporary provisions to allow an increased tax 
deduction for certain capital equipment.33 There is even a 
Washington-based advocacy group that extols the virtues of 
                                                     
 30. The Future of Capital Formation: Hearing Before the Comm. on Oversight & 
Gov’t Reform, 112th Cong. 4 (2011) (statement of Mary Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
112hhrg70517/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg70517.pdf (“Facilitating capital formation, protecting 
investors, and maintaining fair, orderly, and efficient markets is the mission of the SEC. 
Cost-effective access to capital for companies of all sizes plays a critical role in our 
national economy, and companies seeking access to capital should not be overburdened by 
unnecessary or superfluous regulations.”). Also, Section 2 of the Securities Act of 1933 
regarding “consideration of promotion of efficiency, competition, and capital formation” 
provides, in part:  
Whenever pursuant to this subchapter the Commission is engaged in 
rulemaking and is required to consider or determine whether an action is 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest, the Commission shall also 
consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether the action will 
promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation. 
15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2012). 
 31. See, e.g., Robert E. Hall & Dale W. Jorgenson, Tax Policy and Investment 
Behavior, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 391, 391, 410 (1967) (attributing investment booms in the 
1950s and 1960s to changes in tax policy). 
 32. See, e.g., Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Public Policy Toward Entrepreneurship, 15 
SMALL BUS. ECON. 283, 288–89 (2000) (describing such benefits for small businesses 
including, for example, possible yearly deductions of up to $17,500 in capital 
expenditures); Philip F. Zeidman et al., The Small Business Investment Company—A Tool 
for Economic Self-Help, 21 BUS. LAW. 947, 950, 961 (1966) (describing the special tax 
benefits for small business investment companies, such as creating a debt reserve of up to 
ten percent of outstanding loans and special rules for the deduction of dividends). 
 33. Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-185, § 103, 122 Stat. 613, 618–
19; American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1201, 123 Stat. 
115, 333–35. 
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capital formation for its own sake, the American Council for 
Capital Formation.34 The worship of capital may be even more 
pronounced in capital-poor developing countries, for which 
prescriptions center upon making capital more available.35 It is 
the formation of capital, everyone seems to believe, that creates 
low commodity prices and broadly distributed benefits, 
unleashing the industry and entrepreneurship of individuals and 
firms in an economic society. 
And yet, despite our universal admiration for capital, a 
precise and widely accepted definition of capital is elusive. Adam 
Smith defined it as “[h]is . . . stock . . . . which, he expects, is to 
afford him [his] revenue.”36 In a similar vein, Robert Solow has 
defined it in passing as generically a “stock of produced or 
natural factors of production that can be expected to yield 
productive services for some time.”37 Gregory Mankiw posits 
capital as current consumption forgone to produce more income 
tomorrow.38 Undergraduate textbooks simply model production 
as a function of just two types of inputs: capital and labor.39 This 
dichotomy is a gross oversimplification, of course. Labor is 
required to build the capital in the first place; in that sense, 
capital can simply be thought of as stored labor.40  
                                                     
 34. Economic Policy, AM. COUNCIL FOR CAPITAL FORMATION, http://accf.org/ 
publications/#economic-policy-tab (last visited Feb. 6, 2014).  
 35. Hernando de Soto’s The Mystery of Capital propounds a theory that people in 
developing countries fail to accumulate wealth because their property cannot be leveraged 
as capital the way that it can in developing countries. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY 
OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 5–6 
(2000). Muhammad Yunus won a Nobel Peace Prize for his pioneering work in the 
business of microfinance in poor communities, making small loans to collateral-poor 
entrepreneurs. Muhammad Yunus—Facts, NOBEL PRIZE, http://www.nobelprize.org/ 
nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2006/yunus-facts.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2014). 
 36. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 162 (Kathryn Sutherland ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1998) (1776). 
 37. Robert M. Solow, Notes on Social Capital and Economic Performance, in SOCIAL 
CAPITAL: A MULTIFACETED PERSPECTIVE 6 (Partha Dasgupta & Ismail Serageldin eds., 
2000). 
 38. Mankiw, supra note 2, at 293. 
 39. David Gordon & Richard Vaughan, The Historical Role of the Production 
Function in Economics and Business, AM. J. BUS. EDUC., Apr. 2011, at 25, 25. The now-
familiar Cobb–Douglas formulation, Y = ALαKβ, is a relation which every economics 
student learns about in undergraduate economics, and it posits production as a function 
of the quantity and productivity of just two types of inputs: labor (L) and capital (K). See 
generally Cobb & Douglas, supra note 1 (deriving and discussing the Cobb–Douglas 
formula); Douglas, supra note 1 (discussing the inputs of labor and capital within the 
Cobb–Douglas formula). Robert Solow’s fundamental neoclassical growth model posits 
growth as a general function of labor, capital, and technology, the latter being a multiplier 
that makes the other two inputs more productive. Solow, supra note 2, at 65–66, 85. 
 40. Hernando de Soto notes that capital “must be fixed and realized in some 
particular subject which lasts for some time at least after that labour is past. It is, as it 
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These, and a number of other definitional complexities, have 
led to some more conceptual and less rigid formulations of 
capital. Gary Becker has, in his seminal work, married labor and 
capital into “human capital” to denote the amount of human 
training and education that is undertaken to produce other 
things (or services).41 Indeed, a broad notion of capital is central 
to the thesis of this Article, as the mystery of how capital retards 
environmental policy reform can only be unlocked when 
considering the many forms of capital invested in polluting 
behavior. 
This Article sets forth a working definition that does not 
seek to bridge or synthesize differences among the economic 
giants that have considered this topic. For purposes of this 
Article, I define capital as a long-lived asset that generates a 
stream of benefits. Capital is long-lived in the sense that it is 
meant to be durable and undergo sustained use over a period of 
time or more generally over a quantity of production.42 Capital 
generates a stream of benefits because that is why it is obtained 
in the first place.43 
Capital is not necessarily costly. In some cases, capital is 
accumulated without effort or cost.44 But even in such cases of 
windfall capital, a possessor’s defense of that capital can be as 
vigorous as that of costly capital.45 The costliness of capital may, 
                                                     
were, a certain quantity of labour stocked up and stored to be employed, if necessary, 
upon some other occasion.” DE SOTO, supra note 35, at 42 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 41. GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS, 
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EDUCATION 16–17 (3d ed. 1993) (expounding on the concept 
of “human capital” and claiming that “[e]ducation and training are the most important 
investments in human capital”). 
 42. See Paul S. Adler & Seok-Woo Kwon, Social Capital: Prospects for a New 
Concept, 27 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 17, 25 (2002) (defining all forms of capital as “long-lived 
asset[s] into which other resources can be invested, with the expectation of a 
future . . . flow of benefits”); Solow, supra note 37, at 6 (“Generically, ‘capital’ stands for a 
stock of produced or natural factors of production that can be expected to yield productive 
services for some time.”). 
 43. See, e.g., Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, 
Corporation Finance, and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261, 265 (1958) 
(stating that a firm’s assets will provide its shareholders with a “stream of profits” during 
a given period of time (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 44. See, e.g., BECKER, supra note 41, at 21–22 (illustrating how human capital can 
be accumulated and developed through children’s family and upbringing); Elinor Ostrom, 
Social Capital: A Fad or a Fundamental Concept?, in SOCIAL CAPITAL: A MULTIFACETED 
PERSPECTIVE, supra note 37, at 172, 174 (“Many types of capital can be created without 
money, or with very little of it . . . .”). 
 45. See, e.g., Christopher L. Dyer & Mark Moberg, The ‘Moral Economy’ of 
Resistance: Turtle Excluder Devices and Gulf of Mexico Shrimp Fishermen, 5 MAR. 
ANTHROPOLOGICAL STUD., no. 1, 1992, at 18, 20–21 (explaining how fishermen develop 
their skill sets and “vehemently resist perceived threats to livelihood”). 
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for psychological reasons, inspire more spirited defense, but for 
purposes of this Article is not a predicate to the points made in 
this Article. 
I consider three kinds of capital: physical, human, and 
social.46 There are many other kinds of assets to which the label 
of “capital” has been attached.47 But these three forms of capital, 
as I describe them below, are the forms of capital that have 
played a prominent role in retarding policy reform to address 
latent environmental externalities.48 
Physical capital is capital that takes on a tangible, physical 
form.49 For example, a power plant, with a useful life of at least 
forty years,50 is an asset that generates a stable stream of 
revenues in the form of consumer electricity payments. Indeed, 
ensuring that environmental regulation does not threaten the 
size or the continuity of that stream of benefits occupies a 
considerable amount of attention from the owners of that 
capital.51 A stable regulatory and price environment is the ideal 
                                                     
 46. Many scholars consider social capital to be a recent addition to the three 
previously widely-accepted forms of capital: physical, human, and natural. See Ostrom, 
supra note 44, at 172–76; Norman Uphoff, Understanding Social Capital: Learning from 
the Analysis and Experience of Participation, in SOCIAL CAPITAL: A MULTIFACETED 
PERSPECTIVE, supra note 37, at 215, 215, 217 (noting that social capital is a recent 
conceptualization of capital, which traditionally has consisted of “the standard three 
categories of capital”—physical, natural, and human). 
 47. Natural resources and environmental conditions can constitute “natural 
capital.” See, e.g., Ostrom, supra note 44, at 174, 182 (inferring that natural resources are 
a form of capital because the removal of natural resources can be detrimental to social 
capital); M.V. Russo, The Emergence of Sustainable Industries: Building on Natural 
Capital, 24 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 317, 320 (2003) (defining “natural capital” in terms of 
natural resources). Capital can also be financial. The term “capital markets” is commonly 
used to refer to equity markets, or stock markets, in which invested monies are hoped to 
generate a future benefit in the form of a stock dividend or an increased share value over 
time. See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical 
Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 383 (1970) (“The primary role of the capital market is allocation of 
ownership of the economy’s capital stock.”); Lindon J. Robison, A. Allan Schmid & 
Marcelo E. Siles, Is Social Capital Really Capital?, 60 REV. SOC. ECON. 1, 7 (2002) 
(defining financial capital as “the symbols and rights associated with credit and money”). 
 48. See discussion infra Part III.A–B. (describing how capital has encumbered 
policy reform in certain industries, which, in turn, has led to environmental problems). 
 49. See Ostrom, supra note 44, at 174 (providing examples of “physical capital” such 
as “buildings, roads, waterworks, tools, cattle and other animals, automobiles, trucks, and 
tractors”). 
 50. For example, a recent regulation by Environment Canada to apply a new 
emissions performance standard for coal-fired power plants “at the end of their useful life” 
assumed a useful life of a power plant to be forty-five years. Reduction of Carbon Dioxide 
Emissions from Coal-Fired Generation of Electricity Regulations, 145 C. Gaz. 2779, 2783 
(Can. Aug. 27, 2011), available at http://www.gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p1/2011/2011-08-
27/pdf/g1-14535.pdf. 
 51. See, e.g., Satish Joshi, Ranjani Krishnan & Lester Lave, Estimating the 
Hidden Costs of Environmental Regulation, 76 ACCT. REV. 171, 173–74, 194 (2001) 
(providing an example of how industries consider the stream of benefits and costs 
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environment, if not the sine qua non of the investment of such 
capital.52 The costliness of physical capital such as a power 
plant,53 coupled with the long time horizons involved in paying 
for such capital,54 lends urgency to the task of monitoring and 
managing, to the greatest extent possible, the regulatory and 
price environments. 
Human capital is most often thought of as education and 
training.55 Generally speaking, the higher the education, the 
greater the value of the human capital.56 Education can be costly, 
not only because of direct costs, but also because of the 
                                                     
when determining whether to bring old plants into environmental compliance or to 
shut them down). 
 52. See Alfred Marcus, J. Alberto Aragon-Correa & Jonatan Pinkse, Firms, 
Regulatory Uncertainty, and the Natural Environmental, 54 CAL. MGMT. REV. 5, 8–9 
(2011) (observing that when the “regulatory trajectory” is certain, industries and firms 
will have more stability in their investments). 
 53. Coal-fired power plants that entered service in 2010 have an estimated average 
“overnight” capital cost of $2,844 to $3,565 per kilowatt of capacity. See U.S. ENERGY 
INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, UPDATED CAPITAL COST ESTIMATES FOR 
ELECTRICITY GENERATION PLANTS 3, 7 tbl.1 (Nov. 2010), available at http://www.eia.gov/ 
oiaf/beck_plantcosts/pdf/updatedplantcosts.pdf. The overnight capital cost is “an estimate 
of the cost at which a plant could be constructed assuming that the entire process from 
planning through completion could be accomplished in a single day.” Id. at 2 n.2. 
 54. As a crude order-of-magnitude calculation, assuming a capacity rate of eighty-
five percent—meaning that the plant runs at an average long-term capacity of eighty-five 
percent, an assumption made by the U.S. Department of Energy in calculating capital 
costs—a 500-megawatt power plant would generate 425 megawatt-hours every hour, 
every day, or 3,723,000 megawatt-hours per year. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T 
OF ENERGY, LEVELIZED COST OF NEW GENERATION RESOURCES IN THE ANNUAL ENERGY 
OUTLOOK 2013, at 4 & tbl.1 (2013), available at http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/er/pdf/ 
electricity_generation.pdf. Using the average 2011 nationwide retail price of electricity, 
$88.10 per megawatt-hour, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ANNUAL 
ENERGY REVIEW 2011, at 255 & tbl.8.10 (2012), available at http://www.eia.gov/ 
totalenergy/data/annual/pdf/sec8_39.pdf, and subtracting out average operations and 
maintenance costs of $35.09 per megawatt-hour, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T 
OF ENERGY, ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL 2011, tbl.8.4 (2012), available at 
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/pdf/epa.pdf, it would take 7.8 years to pay back the 
capital costs. Of course, this crude calculation omits many other costs, factors, and 
variables, including finance costs, transmission costs, and other expenses associated with 
running a power plant. 
 55. BECKER, supra note 41, at 17. 
 56. See id. at 169–70 & tbl.4, 223–24 & tbl.17 (showing greater earning capacities 
for college graduates compared to high school graduates). Although the marginal returns 
to a college education have not always been historically higher than the marginal returns 
to high school education, the marginal returns to college education have always been 
positive. See CLAUDIA GOLDIN & LAWRENCE F. KATZ, THE RACE BETWEEN EDUCATION AND 
TECHNOLOGY 76, 78–79 & tbl.2.5 (2008) (showing positive returns to college schooling); 
Richard Vedder, Universities and Income Equality: New Evidence and Conjectures, 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Aug. 25, 2011), http://www.chronicle.com/blogs/innovations/ 
universities-and-income-equality-new-evidence-and-conjectures (discussing the “law of 
diminishing returns” as applied to higher education). 
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opportunity costs of forgone income.57 Indisputably, human 
capital is valuable, as productivity is observed to be clearly and 
consistently greater in the presence of human capital.58 Thus 
human capital is, by itself, something that generates a stream of 
benefits, in the form of earnings that would not otherwise be 
realized. 
Importantly, human capital need not be formal. While 
human capital is most easily conceived as formal schooling or on-
the-job training,59 there are clearly many other forms of human 
capital. Human capital may be the acquired knowledge of some 
facet of resource extraction, or some operational expertise 
connected to a specific industrial process. The acquisition of 
human capital may not be part of any organized effort at all. 
Microsoft co-founder Bill Gates and Apple co-founder Steve Jobs, 
both college dropouts, owe a considerable amount of their success 
to human capital they acquired at early, formative stages of life.60 
In almost all cases, human capital requires significant costs to 
obtain, has the potential to be long-lived, and can generate a 
long-lived stream of benefits.61 
Finally, social capital, as it is conceived in this Article, 
consists of the variety of interpersonal and intra-organizational 
bonds that are formed when one signals to another that 
cooperation is sought.62 Among economists, there is some 
                                                     
 57. See, e.g., Theodore W. Schultz, Capital Formation by Education, 68 J. POL. 
ECON. 571, 573, 577 (1960) (stating that students incur opportunity costs while in college 
such as reduced leisure and forgone income from employment not requiring an education). 
 58. Theodore W. Schultz, Investment in Human Capital, 51 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 3 
(1961) (“[K]nowledge and skill are in great part the product of investment and, combined 
with other human investment, predominantly account for the productive superiority of 
the technically advanced countries.”). 
 59. For example, Becker’s original empirical work focuses on the measurable 
benefits of schooling and on-the-job training. See BECKER, supra note 41, at 17–21 (noting 
that the most important components of human capital are education and on-the-job 
training). 
 60. MALCOLM GLADWELL, OUTLIERS: THE STORY OF SUCCESS 50–54 (2008) 
(describing the “extraordinary series of opportunities” that Gates was presented with at 
an early age); WALTER ISAACSON, STEVE JOBS 3–20 (2011) (illustrating how Steve Jobs 
acquired human capital at an early age by getting hands-on experience with computers 
and electronics). 
 61. See BECKER, supra note 41, at 117 (stating that human capital is expensive due 
to the high cost of education and the long period required to accumulate knowledge and 
skills); James S. Coleman, Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, 94 AM. J. 
SOC. 95, 116 (Supp. 1988) (“[T]he person who invests the time and resources in building 
up [human] capital reaps its benefits in the form of a higher-paying job, more satisfying or 
higher-status work, or even the pleasure of greater understanding of the surrounding 
world.”). 
 62. See Ostrom, supra note 44, at 176 (defining “social capital” and noting that 
individuals can be more productive when activities are coordinated). 
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controversy as to whether the term “capital” can be coherently 
applied to something like the social interactions that make up 
what is popularly referred to as social capital.63 For those 
economists that engage with the concept of social capital, the 
focus is typically on how it increases productivity. After all, what 
good would social capital be, apart from the psychological 
benefits of social belonging?64 If social capital is to have economic 
content, then it must have a role in economic performance. 
What is different about social capital is that the social 
interactions that make up social capital do not primarily have 
economic motivations. The concept of social capital thus draws 
heavily from the work of Robert Putnam’s Bowling Alone,65 
which chronicles the decline of social institutions in the United 
States, the result of which is a lack of a social fabric that made 
many cooperative endeavors possible in the past.66 Putnam’s 
argument is that social networks enhance political and civic 
life without consciously having these outcomes as objectives.67 
The economic perspective is thus analogous to Putnam’s 
argument: social capital enhances economic productivity 
without consciously having economic productivity as its 
primary goal.68 
                                                     
 63. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Observations on Social Capital, in SOCIAL CAPITAL: 
A MULTIFACETED PERSPECTIVE, supra note 37, at 3, 3–4 (advocating the abandonment of 
“social capital” terminology); Robison, Schmid & Siles, supra note 47, at 7–8 (“We don’t 
need the new word ‘social capital.’”); Solow, supra note 37, at 6–7 (criticizing the idea of 
“social capital” because the original meaning of “capital” was associated with physical, 
durable objects). 
 64. Economists argue that joining social networks have noneconomic benefits, and 
are at least in part the motivation for joining. See, e.g., Arrow, supra note 63, at 3 (“There 
is considerable consensus also that much of the reward for social interactions is 
intrinsic—that is, the interaction is the reward—or at least that the motives for 
interaction are not economic. People may get jobs through networks of friendship or 
acquaintance, but they do not, in many cases, join the networks for that purpose.”); 
Robison, Schmid & Siles, supra note 47, at 7–17 (explaining how some critics argue that 
social capital does not contain an opportunity cost, which is an essential component to 
true “capital,” but arguing that social capital does in fact exhibit many of the qualities of 
“capital”). 
 65. See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF 
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 351–52, 358 (2000) (discussing how social capital is intertwined 
with the concepts of liberty, tolerance, and equality). 
 66. Id. at 352–59 (positing that social capital began to decline in the 1960s when 
“tolerance and diversity blossomed,” causing Americans to become “disconnected from 
civic life and from one another”). 
 67. Id. at 359 (“[I]n high-social-capital states people from different social classes are 
equally likely to attend public meetings, to lead local organizations, and the like . . . .”).  
 68. See Arrow, supra note 63, at 4 (“The essence of social networks is that they are 
built up for reasons other than their economic value to the participants . . . .”); Ostrom, 
supra note 44, at 174 (observing that human-made capital, including social capital, is 
accumulated incidental to other activities and leads to more income). 
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Drawing on the working definition of capital set forth in this 
Article, social capital is just another asset that is long-lived and 
can generate a long-lived stream of benefits. Of the three forms of 
capital considered in this paper, it is the least costly and time-
consuming to acquire, and the stream of benefits flowing from it 
consists of a number of intangible benefits, be it informational 
benefits or just the small favors and graces extended to those 
within a social fabric.69 These benefits can be extremely 
important. James Coleman provides a compelling example of the 
importance of social capital in the Jewish diamond merchant 
community, in which merchants entrust fellow merchants with 
diamonds worth very large amounts of money.70 The reason that 
thievery is nonexistent in this community, despite ample 
opportunity to engage in it, is explained by the social 
interconnectedness of the merchants. Stealing would result in 
ostracism from a community and forfeiture of social, family, and 
religious ties.71 Social capital thus often plays a vital economic 
role, lubricating mercantile relations while obviating the need for 
expensive and perhaps ultimately futile monitoring.72 
Social capital could play a critical role in motivating poor, 
resource-based communities to fight regulation. In resource-
based communities otherwise lacking in physical or human 
capital, social capital is a more egalitarian form of capital, 
requiring few of the financial resources that are necessary and 
sometimes unavailable to socioeconomically disadvantaged 
groups.73 Strong social interconnectedness has been observed in a 
variety of fishing communities.74 As it happens, fishers are, even 
among resource industries, legendary for their resistance to 
regulation.75 As in the Jewish diamond broker example, trust and 
                                                     
 69. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 61, at 98–99 (inferring that social capital requires 
fewer expenditures because it is formed through relations and interactions). 
 70. Id.  
 71. Id. at 99. 
 72. See id. (observing that strong “family, religious, and community ties” yield 
relationships built on trust with little cost). 
 73. Putnam has written that “[h]istorically social capital has been the main weapon 
of the have-nots, who lacked other forms of capital.” PUTNAM, supra note 65, at 359. 
 74. James M. Acheson, The Maine Lobster Market: Between Market and Hierarchy, 
1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 385, 385–86 (1985); Sean R. Lauer, Entrepreneurial Processes in an 
Emergent Resource Industry: Community Embeddedness in Maine’s Sea Urchin Industry, 
70 RURAL SOC. 145, 156, 158–59, 162 (2005); James A. Wilson, Adaptation to Uncertainty 
and Small Numbers Exchange: The New England Fresh Fish Market, 11 BELL J. ECON. 
491, 494–95 (1980). 
 75. See, e.g., Dyer & Moberg, supra note 45, at 27–31 (examining the strong 
resistance among shrimp fishermen toward federal regulation); Shi-Ling Hsu, What Is a 
Tragedy of the Commons? Overfishing and the Campaign Spending Problem, 69 ALB. L. 
REV. 75, 128 (2005); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to 
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reciprocity, the social capital that is formed from long-running 
relationships, have served a vital economic purpose for low-profit 
industries that cannot afford expensive or time-consuming 
monitoring efforts.76 Indeed, when social capital is low—when 
interconnectedness is not present—fishing communities that 
otherwise resemble other communities with high social capital 
function much less efficiently and are much less profitable.77 
Social capital is still, in a sense, costly to obtain, as it 
requires time and effort to earn trust and to credibly signal the 
intent to cooperate. Like physical and human capital, once 
created by sustained cooperation or assistance, social capital can 
yield a stream of benefits that becomes extremely valuable and in 
some cases, economically necessary. Even though social capital is 
not readily monetizable, it can be even more valuable to its 
holder than tangible assets like physical capital.78 Perhaps more 
significantly, it can be the only form of capital held by some 
individuals and some groups.79 
To be sure, most capital contains combinations of all three 
kinds of capital.80 Physical capital contains the embedded human 
capital required to design and build a highly sophisticated and 
expensive piece of equipment. Social capital is invariably 
embedded as well, in the form of the informal cooperative 
arrangements that are needed for a large-scale endeavor to be 
productive. Physicality is just the most obvious aspect of capital. 
III.  HOW CAPITAL IMPEDES REFORM 
Exactly how does the presence of excess capital impede 
policy reform? This Part briefly describes the capital that is 
                                                     
Governing the Commons, 30 ENVTL. L. 241, 244–45 (2000) (“Many resource users, 
moreover, might conclude that they are better off in a commons free-for-all than in a 
world constrained by property rights, unified management, or regulation.”). 
 76. Coleman, supra note 61, at 98–99; Wilson, supra note 74, at 495 (“[T]he 
economic significance of a trustworthy relationship lies in the reduction in [an 
individual’s] costs of verifying the statements of the other party. This reduction in 
transactions costs creates strong economic forces which favor the extension of the 
bilateral relationship to exchanges of other goods and services.”). 
 77. See Sean R. Lauer, Exchange Relationships in Inshore Fisheries, 23 SOC. F. 503, 
506–07 (2008) (discussing how low social capital creates distrust and opportunism, 
causing increased transaction costs due to “frequent misunderstandings, conflicts, delays 
and breakdowns, and increased investment in the monitoring of exchanges”). 
 78. Adler & Kwon, supra note 42, at 22, 29–30; see PUTNAM, supra note 65, at 359 
(showing that groups of individuals lacking the means to obtain expensive forms of capital 
rely heavily on social capital). 
 79. PUTNAM, supra note 65, at 359. 
 80. Coleman, supra note 61, at 100–01 (describing the linkage between physical, 
human, and social capital). 
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embedded in a number of industries that have been belatedly 
shown to cause a number of environmental problems. This Part 
then sets out a simple model showing how relatively small 
incentives for capital formation might lead to large increases in 
capital investment, creating a tendency to “super-size” capital. 
 A. Overcapitalization as a Drag on Environmental Reform 
The thesis of this Article is that legal rules and institutions 
have helped create too much capital, which has led to a 
heightened resistance to legal reform. Legal rules and 
institutions have overpromoted the formation of capital that is 
later discovered to cause latent environmental harms.81 Even 
after the latent environmental harms come to light, laws have 
overprotected capital at the expense of environmental quality.82 
This is at least in part the story of how almost every 
environmental externality has been allowed to persist longer 
than a rational society would have allowed.83 In some way, 
capital has gotten in the way of solving almost every 
environmental problem in the history of humankind.84 
It is important to consider capital in its varied forms, not 
just the physical capital—the bricks and mortar that are easily 
priced and monetizable—but the human and social capital that is 
intertwined with industrial practices and processes. The 
                                                     
 81. See, e.g., Shi-Ling Hsu, The Real Problem with New Source Review, 36 ENVTL. L. 
REP. 10,095, 10,096–98 (2006) (discussing “grandfather clauses” and how such laws have 
permitted industries to infuse more capital into older facilities, leading to environmental 
problems); Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, If Your Grandfather Could Pollute, So Can You: 
Environmental “Grandfather Clauses” and Their Role in Environmental Inequity, 45 
CATH. U. L. REV. 131, 168–70 (1995) (suggesting that “grandfather clauses” have allowed 
industries to opt out of complying with environmental regulations, thus avoiding 
expensive capital outlays and causing further environmental damage). 
 82. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 81, at 168–70 (asserting that laws such as 
“grandfather clauses” have overprotected capital at the expense of environmental harm). 
 83. Id. (advocating that the allowance of capital-protective laws prolongs 
environmental harms). 
 84. See, e.g., Cees van Beers & Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh, Environmental Harm 
of Hidden Subsidies: Global Warming and Acidification, 38 AMBIO 339, 339–41 (2009) 
(explaining how reliance on government subsidies, a form of capital, have prolonged 
environmental emissions problems); R.T. Paine et al., Trouble on Oiled Waters: Lessons 
from the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 27 ANN. REV. ECOLOGY & SYSTEMATICS 197, 222, 228 
(1996) (discussing how then-existing capital was ineffective to clean up the Exxon Valdez 
oil spill and suggesting superior capital); Lawrence C. Smith, Jr., L. Murphy Smith & 
Paul A. Ashcroft, Analysis of Environmental and Economic Damages from British 
Petroleum’s Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 74 ALB. L. REV. 563, 565, 572–74 (2010) 
(attributing lack of physical and human capital, such as clean-up crews, vessels, and 
equipment, to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill’s damaging effects, as well as lack of social 
capital in the form of blocking aid from countries that had offered to help with the 
cleanup). 
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operation of physical capital to generate wealth requires a 
tremendous amount of human capital and industry-specific 
know-how. In addition, any endeavor of any reasonable size 
requires informal cooperation and the development of a network 
of social capital. The importance of such human and social capital 
is likely to be understated because their acquisition costs will 
generally not reflect their intrinsic value.85 For individuals 
possessing human capital that would be devalued by changes in 
industrial practices (such as oil rig or oilfield workers), or social 
capital that is specific to a small town that is predicated on a 
specific practice (such as that of a fishing or coal-mining 
community), their role in an anachronistic industry may be the 
only realistic source of income or sustenance. If, as is very often 
the case, these kinds of human or social capital may not be 
transferred to another setting, the switching costs for these 
people are essentially infinite. Were the source of income in these 
industries and communities to dry up, these people would 
essentially lose everything. That desperation may be a false 
perception, but for purposes of explaining the level of resistance 
to reform, it may as well be reality. 
When these broader forms of capital are considered, it becomes 
less of a mystery as to why policy reform can be so politically and 
legally painful. Cost-benefit analyses do not capture the full array of 
perceived costs: the losses to human and social capital occurring 
after environmental regulation (or some other economic change) are 
highly salient to those possessing it, and far exceed any monetizable 
amount.86 And yet, there is no basis for taking such human and 
capital costs into account, or for compensating the holders of such 
capital; there is no inherent societal value of human or social capital 
if it is specific to an anachronistic industry.87 
Overcapitalization plays a central role in the greatest 
environmental problem and market failure ever: global climate 
                                                     
 85. See Adler & Kwon, supra note 42, at 22 (stating that social capital is not 
“amenable to quantified measurement”); Mankiw, supra note 2, at 293–94 (asserting that 
human capital has the potential to be underestimated due to the complexity of valuing its 
variables). 
 86. See Jessica Crowe, The Role of Natural Capital on the Pursuit and 
Implementation of Economic Development, 51 SOC. PERSP. 827, 833 (2008) (inferring that 
environmental regulations can have negative impacts on communities, including social 
and human capital aspects); David S. Reay, Costing Climate Change, 360 PHIL. 
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y 2947, 2948–49 (2002) (observing that cost–benefit analyses 
with respect to climate change are not always able to reflect all of the social, 
technological, or environmental costs of emissions). 
 87. See Adler & Kwon, supra note 42, at 22 (positing that social capital costs are 
difficult to monetize); Mankiw, supra note 2, at 293–94 (inferring that human capital 
costs are oftentimes undervalued). 
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change.88 Developed economies have developed largely because of 
capital-intensive energy sectors.89 Thanks to sprawling energy 
infrastructures, fossil fuels are efficiently extracted, transported, 
and burned to generate energy at low prices. The problem is that 
greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuel-based economies 
threaten to irreversibly and catastrophically warm the planet.90 
Coal, the most carbon-intensive of the fossil fuels, continues to 
play a central role in energy provision.91 As noted briefly above,92 
strong convincing evidence exists that coal combustion, given its 
social and environmental costs and its contribution to climate 
change, is simply no longer worth it.93 And yet, coal combustion 
persists. Most energy forecasts project an increase in coal 
production.94 The world’s stock of coal-fired power plants, with a 
combined value in the trillions of dollars,95 are not about to be 
abandoned. And it is not only the existing stock of coal-fired 
power plants that comprise the sluggish capital, but the human 
and social capital that is locked into a fossil fuel-centered way of 
doing things may ultimately consign the world population to 
living on a climate-changed planet. 
All this is to say that capital, in all its forms, has played a 
special role in blocking environmental law and policy reform. 
                                                     
 88. Nicholas Stern, the author of the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate 
Change, has called climate change the “greatest market failure the world has seen.” 
NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW xviii, 4, 27 
(2007) (attributing climate change to human activities); supra notes 81–82 and 
accompanying text (discussing how overcapitalization helped perpetuate the harmful 
effects of greenhouse emissions). 
 89. See Michal C. Moore, Renewable Technologies to Power and Empower the 
Developing World, 16 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 377, 378, 383–90 (2005) (discussing 
energy’s importance to developed and developing nations). 
 90. For a brief review of the voluminous literature on greenhouse gases and the 
risks of climate change, see HENSON, supra note 13, at 20. 
 91. Id. at 289–90. 
 92. See supra notes 23–27 and accompanying text. 
 93. Even the most conservative estimates of the costs of climate change, coupled 
with other externalities, suggest that the benefits of this anachronistic industry are far 
exceeded by the costs. See, e.g., Muller, Mendelsohn & Nordhaus, supra note 18, at 1665 
(showing that coal plants have damages and costs that exceed the benefits). 
 94. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, AEO2014 EARLY RELEASE 
OVERVIEW 17–18 tbl.1 (2014), available at http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/er/pdf/0383er 
(2014).pdf. 
 95. A very rough estimate of the value of the stock of the world’s coal-fired power 
plants can be obtained by multiplying world capacity, IEA ENERGY TECH. NETWORK, 
COAL-FIRED POWER (2010), available at http://www.iea-etsap.org/web/E-TechDS/PDF/E01-
coal-fired-power-GS-AD-gct.pdf; Electricity Generating Capacity, U.S. ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY (Jan. 3, 2013), http://www.eia.gov/electricity/capacity/, by a 
weighted average of overnight costs, weighted by plant location, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, 
PROJECTED COSTS OF GENERATING ELECTRICITY 2010, at 60 (2010). This back-of-the-
envelope calculation is $3.6 trillion USD. 
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Perhaps more than even the stickiness of physical capital, 
environmental policy reform has bumped up against human and 
social capital that has become specialized to a specific industry or 
practice. These forms of capital can come to represent the very 
identity of a firm, person, or group. Destroying that capital can 
appear to be tantamount to destruction of that firm, person, or 
group. Resistance to reform will naturally be vigorous. 
B.  A Model of How Capital Impedes Reform 
To see how this overcapitalization can lead to policy inertia, 
consider a simple stylized example of two types of investments: a 
low-capital-cost, low-benefit-stream investment, and a high-
capital-cost, high-benefit-stream investment. The goal of any 
acquisition of any capital is to enjoy a stream of future benefits, 
but along with a higher stream of future benefits comes the risk 
that the future benefits may not fully materialize (for example, 
due to an unfavorable change in the regulatory or economic 
environment). Absent risk, the long-term value of the high-
capital-cost, high-benefit-stream investment is greater.96 In this 
simple example, the only reason to choose a low-capital, low-
profit strategy over high-capital, high-profit strategy is the 
avoidance of risk. Of course, this abstracts away from many other 
determinants of capital ownership, like access to capital and 
discounting, and abstracts away from many other attributes of 
capital ownership, like market power and signaling benefits or 
detriments (like prestige or scorn). But heuristically, it is 
reasonable to work from the simplifying assumptions that the 
only reason to take on more expensive capital and the attendant 
risk is to generate a larger stream of benefits. 
These two strategies are graphically depicted in Figure 1. 
Two different firms make a capital investment at an initial 
investment cost, C1, for the high-capital, high-profit strategy, 
and C2, for the low-capital, low-profit strategy. The cost of 
capital instantly drives down firm profitability, but capital 
generates a revenue stream that increases firm profitability as 
sales of the produced good generate revenues to pay back the cost 
of capital. In Figure 1, the profitability of the firms, i.e., the 
cumulative sum total of firm revenues and expenses, is graphed 
as a function of q, the quantity of sales. This cumulative profit 
line—the solid line for the high-capital, high-profit strategy—has 
                                                     
 96. “Risk” is defined as “a chance of injury or loss.” Elke U. Weber & Richard A. 
Milliman, Perceived Risk Attitudes: Relating Risk Perception to Risky Choice, 43 MGMT. 
SCI. 123, 128 (1997). 
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a steeper slope than the dotted line than that for the low-capital, 
low-profit strategy. Figure 1 represents the simple case in which 
the price and operating costs are constant for all units sold, so 
that profitability is linear in q. In an even simpler case, sales 
would be uniform over units and also over time, so that the 
horizontal axis could be time and the payback period represented 
by the point in time at which the profitability crosses the 
horizontal axis. 
Ultimately, capital generates a cumulative profit. Assuming 
the expected life of the capital in both cases to be h, the cost of 
risk associated with the high-capital, high-profit strategy is r. 
This also abstracts away from considerations having to do with 
discounting. 
 
Figure 1 
 
Ex ante, the cost of risk is simply a premium that is 
assumed by the firm adopting a high-capital, high-profit 
strategy. The premium compensates for the risk of a regulatory 
change that, in this simple case, renders the capital obsolete 
and valueless. So if a firm is risk-taking, it adopts the high-
capital, high-profit strategy because the risk premium is 
sufficient compensation for the risk. Relatively risk-averse firms 
will opt for the low-capital, low-profit strategy. In Figures 2a 
and 2b below, a regulatory change that renders the capital 
obsolete and valueless occurs when the firm has sold x units. 
The losses for the high-capital, high-profit strategy and the low-
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capit     n in Figures 2a and 2b 
below       
 
                                                 Figure 2b. 
 
It is thus not the capital itself that industries, firms, and 
individuals fight vigorously to protect; it is the expected stream 
of benefits that inspires such vigorous defense. It so happens that 
most of the time we should expect that the more expensive the 
capital, the greater the stream of benefits. But that would be an 
imprecise conclusion. Expected benefits could well be capitalized 
into a valuation of capital, but far from being universally true, 
there is ample reason to suspect that capital is rarely perfectly 
priced to reflect the expected stream of benefits.97 Ultimately, it 
is the hoped-for stream of benefits that a firm, having acquired 
capital, will struggle to protect; it will expend any amount up to 
the value of the hoped-for but lost stream of benefits.98 
Obviously, the loss suffered by an unfavorable change in the 
legal or economic environment is greater in the high-capital, 
high-profit scenario; there is a larger stream of benefits to lose. 
All other things being equal, as long as the high-capital, high-
profit strategy yields higher marginal profits (again, this is 
assumed, because in this simple model there would otherwise be 
no reason to expend higher amounts of capital), the loss L1 will 
always be greater than the loss L2. 
What is nonintuitive about the role of capital is the ex post 
amplification of the importance of the initial investment. Ex ante, 
the equilibrium cost of the risk is r. Ex post, however, once the 
                                                     
 97. See, e.g., Franklin M. Fisher, On the Misuse of the Profits–Sales Ratio to Infer 
Monopoly Power, 18 RAND J. ECON. 384, 385, 392–94 (1987). 
 98. See Patrick Gaughan, Paul Lerman & Donald Manley, Measuring Damages 
Resulting from Lost Functionality of Systems, J. LEGAL ECON., July 1993, at 11, 14–17 
(describing capital budgeting techniques which weigh the current investment expenditure 
with the future value of the stream of benefits that investment will likely produce). 
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capital is sunk, the stake is not just r, nor is it just the cost of 
capital. After the initial investment in capital, the risk of loss is 
equal to the expected stream of benefits. In order to combat such 
a loss, the owner of capital will expend any amount of money up 
to the expected loss (L1 or L2), which could well exceed the cost 
of the capital (C1 or C2). So the amount of money spent on 
resisting policy change can be highly sensitive to initial decisions 
on capital investment. Just a subtle nudge, such as that provided 
by an obscure legal provision, can magnify differences in capital 
investment and lead to a very different world in terms of 
incentives to resist policy change. 
Whether a firm chooses the high-capital, high-profit strategy 
or not thus has profound implications for economic efficiency. Put 
simply, the greater the value of the capital, the greater the threat 
of obsolescence for the firm owning the capital, and the greater 
efforts it will undertake to resist reform. An overcapitalized 
society will be a society in which there are more efforts to resist 
reform. Because capital in its various forms regularly experiences 
obsolescence,99 a capital-protecting society is a society that is less 
agile and less receptive to reform that threatens the value of that 
capital. 
Note that losses L1 and L2 are only fully realized if the 
capital is “stranded,” or unsusceptible of redeployment. More 
generally, the problem of avoiding loss can be considered as a 
problem with switching costs, and the losses L1 and L2 can be 
more generally considered the net costs of being forced 
(economically or by regulation) to switch capital to a new use. L1 
and L2 are thus the lesser of switching costs and the complete 
economic loss of a stream of benefits. 
This theory of capital-protecting offers insight into a further 
subtlety. When there is human or social capital involved, the 
monetization of a stream of benefits could appear quite small in 
comparison with the value of physical capital. But when the stream 
of benefits generated by that human or social capital is perceived 
(accurately or not) to be the only possible source of income, the 
marginal value of the stream of benefits generated by that human 
or social capital can be extremely high to the capital holder, perhaps 
even infinite. Defense of this kind of capital could be very vigorous. 
In sum, capital will always pose a barrier to policy reform 
because policy reform will always take place when some capital 
                                                     
 99. For example, one form of capital discussed in this Article, nuclear power plants, 
frequently becomes obsolete. See, e.g., Stephen Maloney, PLEX: Nuclear Plant Life 
Extension or Extinction?, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Nov. 15, 1992, at 15, 19–20 (discussing 
SONGS 1, a nuclear power plant originally built in 1967 that has since become obsolete). 
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assets have some remaining life and have the capacity to 
generate a prospective stream of benefits.100 Switching costs are 
never zero, so redeployment will always be costly.101 A normal 
economy will thus always generate some resistance to policy 
change. But the problem identified in this Article is that legal 
rules have biased capital decisions toward larger capital, larger 
profits, and concomitantly larger risks of obsolescence. Having 
sunk a larger investment into capital, owners of that capital will 
resist policy reform with greater effort. A systemic overpromotion 
and overprotection of capital is thus creating a greater drag on 
policy reform than would otherwise be the case.102 
IV.  THE ROLE OF LAW AND LAWMAKING IN PROMOTING AND 
PROTECTING CAPITAL 
What exactly is the role of law in this story of policy inertia? 
The focus of this Article is on the role that law and policy play on 
the antecedent conditions that give rise to an overcapitalized 
economy, thereby generating policy inertia. Law and policy 
create overcapitalized economies in two ways: (i) laws that 
overpromote the formation of capital, and (ii) rules that 
overprotect capital from changes in its legal or economic 
environment. 
Laws that promote the formation of capital create policy 
inertia indirectly because they lower the cost of capital and induce 
larger investments than would otherwise occur.103 Capital-friendly 
rules thus enlarge capital stock and therefore increase the 
incentives to resist reform. In short, capital-friendly rules impede 
policy reform by increasing the private costs of policy reform.104 
                                                     
 100. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 81, at 168 (noting that existing capital may pose 
barriers to reform when legislators conclude that it is more economically efficient to allow 
existing facilities to operate under less stringent (but environmentally harmful) standards 
and take advantage of their remaining capital rather than render them obsolete). 
 101. See Mark R. Patterson, Product Definition, Product Information, and Market 
Power: Kodak in Perspective, 73 N.C. L. REV. 185, 199 (1994) (“[E]very purchaser of a 
product that requires some capital investment incurs [switching costs]. Whenever such a 
product still has useful life, that remaining life will have value that will be costly to 
sacrifice in switching to a different product.”). 
 102. Grandfather clauses “place[] the cost of the compliance burden on . . . those who 
may not be aware that they will be affected, and therefore cannot combat the regulatory 
enactment.” Robertson, supra note 81, at 169. This has the effect of preventing policy 
reform, as “legislators may be able to enact legislation which, without the inclusion of a 
protective grandfather clause, would be politically impossible.” Id. 
 103. See, e.g., Ellen Lapson & Richard Hunter, The Future of Fuel Diversity: Crisis or 
Euphoria?, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Oct. 2004, at 60, 64 (explaining how, through legislation, 
Congress can “reduce risk and lower the cost of capital”). 
 104. See supra Part III.A (explaining how overcapitalization impedes environmental 
reform). 
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The latter mechanism, rules that overprotect capital, 
prolong the life of capital even when environmental harms 
outweigh economic benefits.105 For instance, a rule 
grandfathering existing capital into older, less stringent 
regulatory schemes is one example.106 Note that this latter 
mechanism has a doubly pernicious effect: it entrenches existing 
capital regardless of its inherent social value, and it also 
produces an antecedent effect of providing assurances to new 
capital investors that their capital will also be similarly protected 
from unfavorable changes in legal rules.107 Investors will 
overinvest knowing that legal leniencies will at least partially 
insure them against obsolescence. 
It is worth bearing in mind that the incentives for capital 
formation can be quite small.108 All that is needed is something to 
change the decision environment, not finance the undertaking. A 
small subsidy can induce the formation of capital by just tilting a 
close decision. It can also induce an upgrade in capital in a 
situation where a more modest investment would otherwise be 
privately optimal. 
This Article will discuss five ways in which law and policy 
overpromote the formation of capital, and overprotect obsolescent 
capital: (1) tax benefits for energy industries; (2) tax benefits for 
mining industries; (3) electric utility regulation; 
(4) grandfathering; and (5) regulatory takings jurisprudence. 
This Part will also discuss the special political application of this 
theory to human and social capital. 
A.  Tax Benefits for Energy Industries 
Clearly, federal and state governments have subsidized the 
formation of energy capital through tax benefits for a long time 
(by some estimates, a century).109 Equally clearly, subsidies have 
                                                     
 105. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 81, at 168–70 (asserting that laws, such as 
“grandfather clauses,” have overprotected capital at the expense of environmental harm). 
 106. See id. at 168 (“[Grandfather clauses] allow some existing facilities to operate 
under less stringent standards.”). 
 107. Id. at 168–70 (describing the “perverse” effects of grandfather clauses). 
 108. See, e.g., Cont’l Tel. Co. of Pa. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 548 A.2d 344, 346 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1988) (recalling that merely normalizing deferred tax expenses for a utility 
was designed to “provide incentives for capital formation”); see also infra Part III.B 
(setting forth a simple model showing that small incentives can lead to large increases in 
capital investment). 
 109. The expensing of intangible drilling and exploration costs for independent oil and 
gas producers has been allowed since 1913. ROBERT PIROG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42374, 
OIL AND NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY TAX ISSUES IN THE FY2013 BUDGET PROPOSAL 3 (2012) 
[hereinafter CRS REPORT], available at http://budget.house.gov/uploadedfiles/crsr42374.pdf; see 
26 U.S.C. § 263(c) (2012) (current tax code provision allowing such expensing). 
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resulted in the formation of excess energy capital.110 But defining 
a subsidy is tricky, especially in the energy industry, in which 
there are both economies and diseconomies of scale, and 
sometimes the need for a regulated monopoly. Is the regulation 
and price-setting of electricity an energy subsidy? Also, certain 
tax advantages inure to the benefit of many industries, of which 
energy is just one;111 would that be an energy subsidy? The 
definitional problems abound. 
This Article will focus on subsidies that: (i) involve direct 
payments from the federal government to an energy firm, (ii) reduce 
or defer the tax liability for an energy firm but do not apply to 
nonenergy firms, or (iii) provide some indirect but clearly financial 
benefit, such as a loan guarantee. These are the types of subsidies 
that are most likely to lower the cost of capital and induce excess 
formation of capital.112 
Some subsidies may promote the formation of capital that 
confers positive externalities. For example, subsidizing the 
construction of electricity transmission lines is more akin to the 
provision of a public good113 that might warrant subsidization. In 
such cases, it might be hard to say if the capital being formed is 
“excess,” as the public-good nature of the problem suggests that 
there would typically be a shortage of capital.114 Those subsidies are 
generally not targeted in this Article, and in fact, are considered 
below as the kind of subsidy that might be socially beneficial. 
What is very much the target of this Article is the kind of 
energy subsidy that seeks to simply lower the price of energy. 
                                                     
 110. See James C. Cox & Arthur W. Wright, The Cost-Effectiveness of Federal Tax 
Subsidies for Petroleum Reserves: Some Empirical Results and Their Implications, in 
STUDIES IN ENERGY TAX POLICY 177, 188 (Gerard Brannon ed., 1975) (finding that special 
tax provisions induced the petroleum industry to maintain larger investments in proven 
reserves); Walter J. Mead, The Performance of Government in Energy Regulations, 69 AM. 
ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 352, 352 (1979) (“These tax subsidies [in the form of 
percentage depletion allowance and expensing of intangible drilling costs] led to increased 
capital flows into exploration.”). 
 111. See, e.g., Philip E. Harris, The Domestic Production Activities Deduction, 12 
DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 101, 103 (2007) (referencing Internal Revenue Code § 199 regarding 
the Domestic Production Activities Deduction, which permits a taxpayer to deduct a 
percentage of their income produced through domestic production activities, regardless of 
industry). 
 112. See Erik F. Gerding, Deregulation Pas De Deux: Dual Regulatory Classes of 
Financial Institutions and the Path to Financial Crisis in Sweden and the United States, 
15 NEXUS 135, 144–45 (2010) (noting that subsidies may afford lower cost of capital). 
 113. TOM TIETENBERG & LYNNE LEWIS, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE 
ECONOMICS 31 (9th ed. 2012); Michael H. Dworkin & Rachel Aslin Goldwasser, Ensuring 
Consideration of the Public Interest in the Governance and Accountability of Regional 
Transmission Organizations, 28 ENERGY L.J. 543, 559 (2007). 
 114. See discussion infra Part V (noting the necessity of adequate electric 
transmission capabilities). 
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While low energy prices do stimulate economic development, 
there is no reason to believe that energy would be undersupplied 
absent a subsidy.115 Energy is not a public good.116 
What then, are the subsidies that have led to the 
formation of excess energy capital? The coal industry has long 
enjoyed a privileged place in American energy policy.117 Most 
coal has been combusted for electricity generation, which, 
because it has predominantly been a regulated utility, has 
enjoyed a special set of legal protections that have resulted in 
a vastly overcapitalized industry.118 But mining coal itself is 
also a privileged activity. Coal mining rights are often owned 
and leased, and disposition of the coal typically results in a 
royalty payment.119 For individual owners receiving royalty 
payments, the royalty payments can be taxed at the lower 
capital gains tax rate.120 While ordinary lease payments (such 
as for residential or commercial property) must be taxed as 
income,121 coal mining rights are considered a capital asset 
that can be taxed at the lower rate.122 This brings marginal 
coal mines into production and expands the attendant 
infrastructure to extract and transport the coal. 
                                                     
 115. See, e.g., Earl Blumenauer, Introduction, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 315, 319 
(2011) (noting that, while some emerging energy technologies may benefit from subsidies, 
traditional energy subsidies do not affect energy price or supply). 
 116. Note that this is not the same thing as making the argument that failing to 
internalize environmental externalities is tantamount to a subsidy. The policy remedy of 
an environmental externality is the imposition of a Pigouvian tax, not the withdrawal of a 
subsidy. Kyle D. Logue & Joel Slemrod, Of Coase, Calabresi, and Optimal Tax Liability, 
63 TAX L. REV. 797, 829 (2010) (defining a Pigouvian tax as one “designed to correct 
externalities”). The thrust of this Article is that certain legal institutions have created 
antecedent conditions that overpromote capital and once formed, overprotect. It is 
different to say that an omission such as the failure to impose a Pigouvian tax is part of 
that legal infatuation with capital. 
 117. FREESE, supra note 23, at 130 (“In the United States, though, still in its 
formative stages, coal would have an even greater impact on the political power structure 
of the nation [as compared to Britain].”). 
 118. Peter S. Glaser, F. William Brownell & Victor E. Schwartz, Managing Coal: 
How to Achieve Reasonable Risk with an Essential Resource, 13 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 177, 186 
(2011); infra Part IV.C. 
 119. See, e.g., Willits v. Peabody Coal Co., 332 S.W.3d 260, 261–62 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2010) (involving a situation in which coal mining rights were leased with an agreement to 
pay royalties upon the gross realization of the coal mined); Sam P. Burchett, The 
Applicant Violator System in Transition, 21 N. KY. L. REV. 555, 559 (1994) (discussing the 
structure of the lessor–lessee relationship in coal mining leases). 
 120. 26 U.S.C. § 631(c) (2012). Section 631 also applies to timber and iron ore. Id. 
§ 631(b)–(c). 
 121. Id. §§ 1(c), 61(a)(3), (6), 63(a) (including royalty payments and monies from 
property dealings in “gross income” and therefore in “taxable income,” which is taxed at 
ordinary tax rates). 
 122. Id. § 631(c). 
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The other fossil fuels, oil and natural gas, have also been 
heavily subsidized. The Internal Revenue Code has long 
granted preferential tax treatment to entities undertaking 
capital projects for the exploration and extraction of oil and 
natural gas.123 Independent oil and gas producers—i.e., small, 
nonintegrated oil and gas producers124—are permitted to deduct 
from income taxes a “percentage depletion” of their oil or gas 
deposit basis rather than a cost depletion method of 
accounting.125 That is, rather than try to estimate the value of 
their deposit and deduct from their annual income taxes, they 
may simply deduct fifteen percent of their gross income as a 
generous proxy for the depreciated value of their oil and gas 
deposits.126 So long as the expected life of the oil and gas well is 
greater than 6.67 years (100 ÷ 15), this represents an 
accelerated depreciation of their asset, and a financial benefit in 
the form of a deferred tax liability.127 In addition, independent 
producers are permitted to take a more generous deduction for 
“intangible drilling costs,” generally defined as a cost that has 
no salvage value and is “incident[al] to and necessary for the 
drilling of wells and the preparation of wells for the production 
of oil and gas.”128 These expenses expressly include “wages, fuel, 
repairs, hauling, supplies, etc.,” that are required for the site 
preparation and drilling of wells.129 Seventy percent of 
intangible drilling costs are deductible from income in the year 
in which they are incurred, and the remaining thirty percent 
depreciated over a five-year period.130 This, too, represents a 
significant benefit in the form of a deferred tax liability. Finally, 
geological and geophysical exploration activities may be 
depreciated over an accelerated two-year schedule, again 
producing a frontloaded depreciation schedule and an effective 
                                                     
 123. See, e.g., id. § 263(c) (allowing expensing of intangible drilling and exploration 
costs for independent oil and gas producers); CRS REPORT, supra note 109, at 3 (“The 
expensing of intangible drilling costs has been part of the federal tax code since 1913.”). 
 124. The Internal Revenue Code defines oil and gas producers as independent if, 
among other requirements, they have no more than $5 million in gross receipts in a given 
year. 26 U.S.C. § 613A(d)(2).  
 125. Id. § 613A(c)–(d); Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4 (2013); CRS REPORT, supra note 109, at 
5. 
 126. CRS REPORT, supra note 109, at 5. 
 127. Id. 
 128. 26 U.S.C. § 263(c); Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4; CRS REPORT, supra note 109, at 1; 
John S. Lowe, Analyzing Oil and Gas Farmout Agreements, 41 SW. L.J. 759, 766 (1987) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 129. Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(a)–(b). 
 130. CRS REPORT, supra note 109, at 3. 
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tax liability deferral.131 These three subsidies are, according to a 
2011 report by the U.S. Energy Information Administration, 
three of the most valuable subsidies for the oil and gas industry, 
estimated by the EIA to be $980 million, $400 million, and $150 
million, respectively, for 2010, for a total of about $1.53 billion.132 
Over time, the subsidies appear even more generous. A 
literature-based study done by a venture capital firm specializing 
in energy investments estimates that from 1918 to 2009, oil and 
gas firms have received $447 billion in subsidies, measured in 
2010 dollars.133 
It is difficult to even guess at the effect of this infusion of 
money on capital formation in the energy industry, and on policy 
resistance. Studies have clearly shown a higher level of 
investment induced by these tax benefits.134 It is another matter 
to determine exactly how much these subsidies have bloated the 
capital stock. But $447 billion over 91 years—an average of $4.9 
billion per year—is a lot of money to inject into even the 
mammoth oil and gas industries. 
It is worth remembering two things. First, because a subsidy 
need only subtly nudge capital decisions, the capital-bloating 
                                                     
 131. See id. at 6 (noting that the current law permits independent producers to 
depreciate geological and geophysical costs over a period of only two years). 
 132. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, DIRECT FINANCIAL 
INTERVENTIONS AND SUBSIDIES IN ENERGY IN FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 18 tbl.6 (2011) 
[hereinafter EIA 2010 REPORT], available at http://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/ 
subsidy/pdf/subsidy.pdf. It is well worth noting that estimates of the value of these 
subsidies, as well as others, vary greatly. In recent budget negotiations, President Obama 
proposed a budget for 2013 that would have eliminated the percentage depletion 
allowance and the expensing of intangible drilling costs, and lengthened the two-year 
amortization period for geological and geophysical activities. CRS REPORT, supra note 
109, at 1–2 & tbl.1. The Congressional Research Service estimated the cost savings of 
these changes to be $13.9 billion, $11.5 billion, and $1.4 billion, all over ten years. Id. at 
5–7. 
 133. See NANCY PFUND & BEN HEALEY, DBL INVESTORS, WHAT WOULD JEFFERSON 
DO? THE HISTORICAL ROLE OF FEDERAL SUBSIDIES IN SHAPING AMERICA’S ENERGY 
FUTURE 29 (2011), available at http://i.bnet.com/blogs/dbl_energy_subsidies_paper.pdf. 
 134. See, e.g., Cox & Wright, supra note 110, at 188–89 (“Federal tax provisions for 
petroleum have had a statistically significant effect in increasing investment in petroleum 
reserves.”); Mead, supra note 110, at 352 (reporting how certain tax subsidies “led to 
increased capital flows into [oil and gas] exploration”). According to the trade group Texas 
Alliance of Energy Producers, President Obama’s similar proposal for fiscal year 2011 to 
eliminate these four tax benefits (and some other, much less expensive ones) would have 
reduced oil and gas investment by $26 billion over ten years. TEXAS ALLIANCE OF ENERGY 
PRODUCERS, OIL & GAS PROVISIONS IN PRESIDENT OBAMA’S PROPOSED 2011 BUDGET (on 
file with Houston Law Review). But there is no study or data to support these estimates. 
Also, given the similarity of this figure with the other estimates (that of the CRS 
estimates for the President’s 2013 proposal, CRS REPORT, supra note 109, and the EIA 
estimates of the cost for fiscal years 2007 and 2010, EIA 2010 REPORT, supra note 132, at 
18 tbl.6, these estimates are more likely just the group’s own estimates of the value of the 
withdrawn subsidies, not the absolute amount of withdrawn capital investments. 
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effect of a subsidy could vastly exceed the cost of the subsidy. So 
$4.9 billion could well have generated excess capital in an 
amount much greater than $4.9 billion. Second, the subsidy itself 
is a source of funding for resistance to policy reform. If even a 
small fraction of $4.9 billion were spent on litigation and 
lobbying activities, the effect on public policy would have been 
profound. 
President Obama has repeatedly proposed to phase out or 
eliminate subsidies for oil and gas companies.135 To the extent 
that these subsidies stimulate the formation of capital, these are 
good steps. There is in most cases nothing remotely resembling a 
public good in the oil and gas industry warranting subsidization. 
But the mistake that the Obama Administration makes—like all 
preceding modern administrations—is to try to right a wrong by 
subsidizing competing, cleaner energy sources such as renewable 
energy.136 Because renewable energy does not impose the 
negative environmental externalities imposed by the extraction 
and combustion of fossil fuels, it would seem to stand to reason 
that it is worth subsidizing their production so as to place fossil 
fuels and renewable sources on a level playing field. 
With an exception discussed below,137 this is mistaken 
thinking. A subsidy lowers the effective cost of capital and 
promotes the formation of new capital.138 The problem with 
promoting capital investment in nonfossil fuel energy sources is 
that it fails to learn from our past mistakes in promoting fossil 
fuel energy sources. How do we know this is the “right” energy 
technology? What will happen if information emerges pointing to 
                                                     
 135. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF 
THE U.S. GOVERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 161–62 tbl.S-8, available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2011-BUD/pdf/BUDGET-2011-BUD.pdf (showing 
the budgetary plan to phase out fossil fuel tax preferences); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FISCAL YEAR 2012 BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, at 
185–86 tbl.S-8, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/ 
fy2012/assets/budget.pdf (same); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT, FISCAL YEAR 2013 BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, at 221–22 tbl.S-9, 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2013/assets/ 
budget.pdf (same). 
 136. See, e.g., Paul M. Kiernan et al., International Energy and Natural Resources, 
44 INT’L LAW. 367, 375–76 (2010) (discussing the Obama Administration’s support for 
renewable energy); Report of the Renewable Energy and Demand-side Management 
Committee, 30 ENERGY L.J. 273, 273–74 (2009) (discussing the Energy Improvement and 
Extension Act of 2008, signed into law by President George W. Bush). 
 137. See infra Part IV.B (discussing tax benefits for the mining industry). 
 138. See, e.g., Note, Reassessing Rent Control: Its Economic Impact in a Gentrifying 
Housing Market, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1835, 1847 (1988) (contending that government 
subsidies lower the effective cost of capital activities, such as low income house 
construction). 
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alternative energy sources that are even cleaner? Promoting the 
formation of capital in specific renewable energy technologies 
runs the risk of locking in these technologies for longer than 
would be optimal.139 Future policy reform efforts to usher in 
newer and even better technologies will be met with resistance 
by the owners of this capital. 
Energy policies in pursuit of cleaner alternatives to fossil fuel 
combustion are pursuing this misguided course. Federal energy 
subsidies have increased since 2007, and although they seek to 
correct a historical imbalance between fossil fuel and renewable 
energy technologies,140 they repeat the historical mistake of trying 
to accomplish an objective by exhorting the formation of capital. 
Federal energy subsidies more than doubled from 2007 to 2010, 
from almost $18 billion to more than $37 billion, and nearly all of 
that increase has been due to subsidies for nonfossil energy 
sources.141 
In some aspects, new subsidies for renewable energy 
providers are even more capital-intensive than those for oil and 
gas. Producers of electricity from renewable energy sources have 
long benefited from a production tax credit, a unitary subsidy for 
each kilowatt-hour of electricity produced using a “qualified” 
production method.142 Section 1102 of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) sweetens things, allowing 
renewable energy providers to elect to take an Investment Tax 
Credit instead of the production tax credit, thereby frontloading the 
subsidy and immediately reducing the cost of capital, rather than 
allowing for a potentially larger stream of subsidy payments.143 But 
even better still, for certain renewable energy providers,144 Section 
1603 of the ARRA offers a cash grant of ten or thirty percent in lieu 
of the investment tax credit and the production tax credit,145 the 
                                                     
 139. See Nina Robertson, Bruce Rich & Lynsey Gaudioso, As the World Burns: A 
Critique of the World Bank Group’s Energy Strategy, 43 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,760, 10,768 
(2013) (“Every new fossil fuel investment locks in [the technology] for decades.”). 
 140. PFUND & HEALEY, supra note 133, at 29 (showing a substantial imbalance 
among the cumulative historical subsidies for oil and gas, nuclear energy, biofuels, and 
renewable energy sources). 
 141. EIA 2010 REPORT, supra note 132, at xi tbl.ES1. 
 142. 26 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2012). 
 143. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), Pub. L. No. 111-5, 
§ 1102, 123 Stat. 115, 319–20 (as amended by the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance 
Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 707, 124 Stat. 3296, 
3312). 
 144. Solar, landfill gas, trash, geothermal, wind, hydro, biomass, marine and 
hydrokinetic energy sources qualify. ARRA § 1603(d)(1) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 45(d)(1)–(4), 
(6)–(7), (9), (11)). 
 145. Id. § 1603(a)–(b). 
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advantage over a tax credit being that there need not be any income 
against which to offset a tax credit.146 The Section 1603 program 
has been “enormously popular,” with expenditures for the grant 
totaling $4.2 billion in 2010,147 and far surpassing the costs of the 
production tax credit and the investment tax credit, which were 
$1.5 billion and $130 million, respectively, in 2010.148 It was even 
an explicit goal of ARRA to inject money into the economy to assist 
in the economic recovery.149 
In addition, the Department of Energy (DOE) operates 
several loan guarantee programs for qualifying projects or firms. 
Section 406 of the ARRA, amending Title XVII of the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005, provides for loan guarantees for “[r]enewable 
energy systems,” “[e]lectric power transmission systems,” and 
“[l]eading-edge biofuel projects.”150 By the end of 2010, DOE 
had issued over $25 billion in loan guarantees.151 It was under 
this program that DOE issued a loan guarantee to the failed 
solar energy company, Solyndra, which brought controversy to 
the program.152 Adding to the controversy, DOE is authorized 
to guarantee 100% of a loan, not a more traditional fraction, 
like eighty percent.153 Some funding was also issued to aid in 
the construction of nuclear power plants.154 Overall, spending 
on renewable energy technologies was much greater than 
spending on fossil fuel technologies: more than $14 billion to 
just over $4 billion.155 
                                                     
 146. See John A. Herrick & Cara S. Elias, Federal Incentives for Clean Energy After 
Solyndra: A Post-Recovery Act Precipice, 87 N.D. L. REV. 625, 678 (2011) (“By allowing 
renewable energy investors to monetize the related tax credits, it has created an avenue 
for investment in projects that would otherwise have been blocked during the economic 
lull following the Recovery Act due to the dearth of investors with tax liability for the tax 
credits to offset.”). 
 147. EIA 2010 REPORT, supra note 132, at 30. 
 148. Id. at 13 tbl.3. 
 149. ARRA § 3(a)(1). 
 150. Id. § 406. 
 151. EIA 2010 REPORT, supra note 132, at 59. 
 152. See, e.g., Hilary Kao, Beyond Solyndra: Examining the Department of Energy’s 
Loan Guarantee Program, 37 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 425, 475–78 (2013) 
(describing the controversy surrounding the loan guarantee program after “Solyndra 
experienced financial difficulties despite having received the DOE loan guarantee 
commitment”); Ashley Southall, House Passes Solyndra Act Aimed at Obama, CAUCUS 
(Sept. 14, 2012, 5:46 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/14/house-passes-
solyndra-act-aimed-at-obama/?ref=solyndra&_r=0. 
 153. See EIA 2010 REPORT, supra note 132, at 64 (explaining that, initially, DOE 
could guarantee a more traditional eighty percent of a loan, but by the time the final 
rulemaking was passed, DOE was authorized to guarantee the full amount). 
 154. See id. (describing how, with the passage of the Fiscal Year 2008 Appropriations 
Act, DOE was authorized to allocate $18.5 billion in loan guarantees to nuclear plants). 
 155. Id. at xiii tbl.ES2. 
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The goal of trying to rapidly ramp up renewable energy 
production is certainly laudable, especially in the face of an 
inability to pass comprehensive climate legislation that might 
achieve an energy transition in a more holistic way.156 It is still 
troubling, however, to consider how much capital is being formed, 
with relatively little known about the relative merits of wind 
energy as opposed to other technologies that may emerge in the 
next several years. From 2000 to 2010, net generation of 
electricity from wind power rose from 6 billion kilowatt-hours to 
95 billion,157 and net summer capacity for wind energy grew from 
just about 8 gigawatts in 2005 to over 39 gigawatts in 2010.158 
This is troubling because the technology of electricity production 
is constantly evolving. Only recently did Congress suddenly 
notice the potential of hydrokinetic energy, the use of wave action 
to generate electricity.159 Only recently has low-tech solar 
thermal energy gained attention,160 as it has become competitive 
much more quickly than the previously favored solar technology, 
photovoltaics.161 If a new and better renewable energy 
technology is discovered, what will be the policy response of 
wind energy developers that have invested billions of dollars? 
As I have argued elsewhere, the correct response to the 
environmental externality of emissions from fossil fuel-fired 
sources is not to try to subsidize all that is not fossil fuels.162 If 
there is a negative environmental externality, the right 
approach is to tax the negative externality, not to subsidize 
everything else. It seems politically more palatable to 
                                                     
 156. Hari M. Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change Implications for the 
Obama Administration, 62 ALA. L. REV. 237, 296 (2011) (“Congress has failed to pass 
major climate change legislation . . . .”). 
 157. EIA 2010 REPORT, supra note 132, at xx tbl.ES5. 
 158. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL 
2010, at 6 tbl.1.1B (2011), available at http://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/html/table1. 
1b.cfm.  
 159. FERC Issues First Pilot License for Tidal Power Project in New York, FED. 
ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, http://www.ferc.gov/media/news-releases/2012/2012-1/01-
23-12.asp (last updated Jan. 23, 2012) (illustrating that hydrokinetic projects are a recent 
endeavor); Hydrokinetic Projects, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, http://www.ferc.gov/ 
industries/hydropower/gen-info/licensing/hydrokinetics.asp (last updated Jan. 22, 2014). 
 160. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 158, at 6 tbl.1.1.B (showing a steady 
increase in net capacity of solar thermal energy from 2000 to 2010); S. Mekhilef, R. Saidur 
& A. Safari, A Review on Solar Energy Use in Industries, 15 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE 
ENERGY REVIEWS 1777, 1778–79 (2011), available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/ 
science/article/pii/S1364032110004533# (“Due to the global energy shortage and 
controlling harmful environmental impacts, application of solar energy has [been] 
receiving much attention in the engineering sciences.”). 
 161. HSU, supra note 7, at 43. 
 162. See id. at 36–37 (“Government subsidization should be viewed with skepticism, 
rather than being the presumptive first option.”). 
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subsidize “good” industries than it is to tax “bad” industries,163 
but the politically expedient approach is less efficient.164 In the 
context of energy policy, a much more effective and efficient 
policy tool than subsidization is a carbon tax.165 Among other 
problems with the pushing-on-a-string effectiveness of trying 
to prop up all that is putatively good,166 subsidizing “good” 
industries promotes the excessive formation of capital. A tax 
on a negative environmental externality is capital neutral.167 
Capital formed in one industry (e.g., wind energy) because 
negative externalities are taxed in another industry (coal, oil, 
or natural gas) will not be as likely to become obsolete because 
it is responding to a technology-neutral price signal, not a 
political judgment. 
B. Tax Benefits for Mining Industries 
There is one industry that may benefit from even greater 
taxpayer generosity than the energy sector: the hard rock 
mining industry. Few industries create as many or as severe 
environmental externalities as the mining industry.168 But 
apparently following in the same industrial-development, low-
commodity-price rationales that animate energy subsidies, a 
variety of favorable tax provisions facilitate the formation of 
                                                     
 163. See id. at 118–23 (“[P]ublic opinion polls seem to show that the American public 
strongly favors subsidy programs to reduce greenhouse gases but strongly opposes carbon 
taxes or gasoline taxes . . . .”). 
 164. See id. at 53–59 (critiquing the United States’ track record with respect to 
making “strategic decisions” and commenting how it is “too easy and too dangerous to fall 
into the trap of thinking that governments can ‘fix’ the problem directly, funding a 
potential ‘home run’ or ‘gamechanger’”); see also MCKINSEY & CO., PATHWAYS TO A LOW-
CARBON ECONOMY 73 (2009), available at www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/dotcom/ 
client_service/sustainability/cost curve pdfs/pathways_lowcarbon_economy_version2.ashx 
(illustrating how the use of subsidies can cause waste). 
 165. See HSU, supra note 7, at 34–37 (comparing the effects of taxing carbon versus 
subsidizing renewable energy); MCKINSEY & CO, supra note 164, at 19, 73 (suggesting 
that a carbon tax would help reduce emissions and discussing the negative externalities of 
subsidies). 
 166. See HSU, supra note 7, at 34–37 (expressing some limitations of subsidization). 
 167. See id. at 45 (labeling a carbon tax as “capital-neutral” because it “does not 
encourage the formation of expensive physical capital that would inhibit future changes 
in production”). 
 168. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT, UNITED NATIONS ENV’T 
PROGRAM, UNIVERSAL OWNERSHIP: WHY ENVIRONMENTAL EXTERNALITIES MATTER TO 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 27 fig.3 (2011), available at http://www.unpri.org/files/ 
uop_long_report.pdf (listing “Industrial Metals & Mining” as the third-highest industry 
sector in terms of environmental costs); Emissions of Greenhouse Gases in the U.S., U.S. 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY (Mar. 31, 2011), http://www.eia.gov/ 
environment/emissions/ghg_report/ghg_methane.cfm (“Natural gas systems and coal 
mines are the major sources of methane emissions in the energy sector.” (citation 
omitted)). 
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mining capital. Exploration and development expenses for 
mining companies, unlike for oil and gas companies, are 
deductible in full in the year those expenses are incurred.169 
The deduction is required to be recaptured when the mine goes 
into production, but many miners are able to avoid this taxable 
event by avoiding “production” status.170 
In Canada, where mining is a centrally important 
industry,171 small, start-up mining companies, known as 
“juniors,” can pass through capital losses—losses that cannot 
be deducted from their income because juniors have no 
income—up to acquiring companies.172 The advantage of 
having this benefit of “flow-through” shares is that a tax 
deduction is essentially sold from an entity that has no income 
against which to deduct expenses, to a larger entity that does. 
Thus, the tax benefit is commodified and made into a valuable 
asset, creating a premium for shares of juniors and stripping 
away significant risk in an inherently risky business. From 
1987 to 1991, $2.5 billion (CAD) of flow-through shares were 
exchanged, accounting for sixty percent of the funding for 
mining exploration over that period.173 Empirical research 
suggests that this has led to capital overinvestment in the 
mining industry and below-market returns to mining 
capital.174 It was the stated policy of the Canadian government 
that the flow-through share device should promote equity 
investments in mining and petroleum companies in Canada, 
and it should provide financing assistance to junior, 
                                                     
 169. Compare 26 U.S.C. § 617(a)(1) (2012), with 26 U.S.C. § 461(i)(2), and 26 U.S.C. 
§ 263(a), (c). 
 170. Treas. Reg. § 1.617-3 (2013). 
 171. Mining, quarrying, and oil and gas extraction together represented eight 
percent of the Canadian economy, and roughly twenty-seven percent of the Canadian 
goods-producing economy in 2012. Canadian Industry Statistics: Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP): Canadian Economy (NAICS 11-91), INDUS. CAN., http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cis-
sic.nsf/eng/h_00013.html#vla2b (last updated Dec. 18, 2013). 
 172. Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. L-1 §§ 40(1)(b), 44.1(8)(b), 110.6(2.1)(d) (Can. 
5th Supp.); KPMG IN CANADA, KPMG, A GUIDE TO CANADIAN MINING TAXATION 7, 12 
(Sept. 2011), http://www.kpmg.com/Ca/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Docu 
ments/5539_KPMG_A%20Guide%20to%20Canadian%20Mining%20Taxation_web.pdf; see 
also Christopher Berry, How to Blow Up a Start Up—The Biggest Financing Pitfall for 
Entrepreneurs, FORBES (July 16, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/discoveryinvesting/ 
2012/07/16/how-to-blow-up-a-start-up-the-biggest-financing-pitfall-for-entrepreneurs-2/ 
(discussing how small start-up mining companies are known as juniors and “generate no 
cash flow, revenue, or earnings”). 
 173. Gordon J. Lenjosek, A Canadian Tax Incentive for Equity Investments in Mining 
and Energy Companies, NEW DIRECTIONS FOR EVALUATION, Fall 1998, at 117, 120. 
 174. See id. at 127 (reporting that “overheating” in the mining industry caused 
incremental drilling activity to be lower than incremental mining exploration spending). 
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nontaxpaying, companies.175 It has apparently succeeded in 
this respect.176  
The extraction of valuable deposits has obviously been vital 
in developing the economies of wealthy countries.177 These 
sectors are particularly capital-intensive and foundational in that 
their abundance seems to be a predicate to economic growth, so 
perhaps they are particularly tempting targets for subsidization. 
But this is precisely the superficial and specious growth 
paradigm that retards policy reform. It is unnecessary, and 
indeed potentially very harmful, for government policy to actively 
stimulate economic growth by promoting the formation of capital. 
The energy and hard rock mining industries stand as prominent 
examples of this bias. 
C.  Electric Utility Regulation 
The law is perhaps no more obsessed with capital in any 
other area than it is in the area of regulated electric utilities. 
Regulated electric utilities are only permitted by their regulators 
to charge ratepayers in accordance with the general formula 
 
R = O + B• r 
 
where R is the total allowed revenues (to be divided up 
among ratepayers), O is the allowed operating expenses, B is the 
company’s “rate base,” all those capital assets from which the 
company is permitted to earn a return, and r is the permitted 
rate of return.178 Given this regulatory structure, it is in the 
company’s interest to acquire more capital and expand the rate 
base as much as possible in order to maximize their permitted 
revenues. This bias is commonly known as the “Averch–Johnson 
effect.”179 Although additions to the company’s rate base must be 
                                                     
 175. Id. at 119. 
 176. See id. at 125 (“[F]low-through shares raised a substantial amount of equity-based 
financing for exploration and development[,] . . . were the dominant means by which funding 
was raised for mining exploration[,] resulted in significant incremental spending on mining 
and petroleum exploration and significant incremental exploration drilling activity[,] . . . and 
assisted non-taxpaying junior exploration companies.”). 
 177. See MINING, MINERALS & SUSTAINABLE DEV. PROJECT, INT’L INST. FOR ENV’T & DEV., 
BREAKING NEW GROUND 172 (2002), http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/G00900.pdf (“Many of the world’s 
richest countries have benefited greatly from minerals extraction. Australia, Canada, Finland, 
Sweden, and the United States, for example, have all had extensive minerals industries and 
used them as a platform for broad-based industrial development.”). 
 178. FRED BOSSELMAN, JIM ROSSI & JACQUELINE LANG WEAVER, ENERGY, ECONOMICS, 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 507 (2000) (describing the formula). 
 179. Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory 
Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052, 1052–53 (1962). 
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“prudently incurred,”180 and must be “used and useful,”181 the 
reality is that the company often has the upper hand in a 
ratemaking setting in which it seeks to justify its expenditures to 
a regulator.182 Empirical evidence for the Averch–Johnson effect 
is not unambiguous, but generally supportive.183 
Courts and commissions hearing ratemaking cases do not, 
however, seem overly concerned about the Averch–Johnson 
effect. In In re Limerick Nuclear Generating Station, the 
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission addressed the question 
of whether a project may be included in the utility’s rate base if 
the project was prudent at the time of commencement but had 
subsequently become unnecessary.184 The opinion, one of only a 
few that actually considered and discussed the Averch–Johnson 
                                                     
 180. Duquesne Light Co. v Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 309 (1989) (“Under the prudent 
investment rule, the utility is compensated for all prudent investments at their actual 
cost when made (their “historical” cost), irrespective of whether individual investments 
are deemed necessary or beneficial in hindsight.”); Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural 
Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 600 (1944) (discussing the Natural Gas Act’s requirement that all 
natural gas rates be just and reasonable); Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n v. Phila. Elec. Co., 31 
P.U.R.4th 15, 29 (Pa. P.U.C. 1978) (entering judgment against a utilities company 
because of expenditures “which would not have been made had prudent management 
been exercised”); Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. 
REV. 548, 592, 617 (1969) (describing the basic workings of the regulatory process). 
 181. Barasch, 488 U.S. at 303–04; Bill Clinton et al., FERC, State Regulators, and 
Public Utilities: A Tilted Balance?, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Spring 1987, at 11, 11, 43 
(describing the “used and useful” requirement). 
 182. For a discussion of the administrative law surrounding ratemaking cases, see 
Jacqueline Lang Weaver, Can Energy Markets be Trusted? The Effect of the Rise and Fall 
of Enron on Energy Markets, 4 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 1, 13, 15 (2004), and Jim Rossi, The 
Political Economy of Energy and Its Implications for Climate Change Legislation, 84 TUL. 
L. REV. 379, 383, 391, 393 (2009). In In re Limerick Nuclear Generating Station, the 
Pennsylvania Utilities Commission, in evaluating expert testimony on a variety of 
technical and economic matters, wrote: 
In performing our analysis, we are cognizant of the fact that many of the 
calculations and figures presented in the context of this proceeding are 
somewhat speculative. Although no one can perfectly see the future, we are 
convinced that those estimates represent more than educated guesswork on the 
part of the witnesses. 
In re Limerick Nuclear Generating Station, 48 P.U.R.4th 190, 192 (Pa. P.U.C. 1982); 
see also Posner, supra note 180, at 617 (showing that, in practice, the regulatory 
agencies do not have as much power over ratemaking as they do in theory). 
 183. See, e.g., Léon Courville, Regulation and Efficiency in the Electric Utility 
Industry, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 53, 70 (1974) (confirming the Averch–Johnson 
proposition of inefficiency); H. Craig Peterson, An Empirical Test of Regulatory Effects, 6 
BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 111, 112, 119, 124 (1975) (providing empirical evidence to 
support the Averch–Johnson proposition); Robert M. Spann, Rate of Return Regulation 
and Efficiency in Production: An Empirical Test of the Averch–Johnson Thesis, 5 BELL J. 
ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 38, 49–50 (1974) (demonstrating the soundness of the Averch–
Johnson proposition through a trans-log production function). 
 184. In re Limerick Nuclear Generating Station, 48 P.U.R.4th, at 200–01. 
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effect, minimized its import.185 The Commission’s glib dismissal 
of the Averch–Johnson effect reveals the bias of ratemaking 
bodies: 
We could better spend our time focusing on whether undue 
and unnecessary financial constraints are leading us 
toward a future of insufficient electricity supply and the 
attendant problems of unnecessarily high electricity prices, 
unnecessarily high oil consumption, and reduced economic 
growth. These questions transcend the close-in arguments 
on [construction work in progress] that turn on relatively 
technical points of consumer discount rates and impacts on 
cost of capital.186 
This treatment seems to acknowledge that the Averch–
Johnson effect is a valid theoretical consideration, but not of any 
practical importance, at least relative to other considerations. 
That is regrettable, and it highlights how disinclined 
policymakers and lawmakers are to critically consider the true 
usefulness of hard and familiar capital. Utility commissions, it 
would seem, are still more concerned with low electricity prices 
and are willing to allow the construction of more capital to 
ensure them.187 
Electric utility regulation also presents the most compelling 
illustration of how an industry will fight to maintain a privileged 
position: rent-preserving through resisting policy reform. The 
catchphrase “stranded costs” was born in the wake of widespread 
state efforts to deregulate electricity generation and liberalize 
energy markets.188 Liberalization means loss of monopoly power, 
and incumbent electricity generation firms in states trending 
towards deregulation complained loudly about the costs of power 
plants that had not yet been recouped from ratepayers.189 
Estimates of the amount of money believed to be at stake in the 
                                                     
 185. Id. at 211–12 (“Averch–Johnson phenomenon—This concept, developed in the 
early 1960s, maintains that the utilities will invariably seek to overbuild their systems. 
The financial disincentive of not allowing [construction work in progress] in the rate base 
is seen as counteracting this tendency. . . . The Averch–Johnson phenomenon is no longer 
applicable—Even if it did apply in the early 1960s, there is little current credibility to the 
[Averch–Johnson] phenomenon given the current depressed financial condition of the 
industry.”). 
 186. Id. at 212. 
 187. Severin Borenstein, The Trouble with Electricity Markets: Understanding 
California’s Restructuring Disaster, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2002, at 191, 192, 195 
(illustrating this concern and its effects on the state of California). 
 188. Id. at 191, 193–94. 
 189. Mark Armstrong & David E.M. Sappington, Regulation, Competition, and 
Liberalization, 44 J. ECON. LITERATURE 325, 329–30 (2006); Timothy J. Brennan & James 
Boyd, Stranded Costs, Takings, and the Law and Economics of Implicit Contracts, 11 J. 
REG. ECON. 41, 42, 44–46, 50 (1997). 
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mid-1990s, the height of deregulation speculation, ranged from 
$34 billion to $210 billion.190 As explained in this Article,191 the 
expected stream of benefits could well be greater than the value 
of the capital stock. The specter of deregulation, which would 
have disadvantaged incumbent electricity generators, was 
enough for the industry to embark upon a massive campaign for 
compensation.192 
The campaigns surrounding electricity deregulation are 
complicated because electricity deregulation itself is complicated. 
States have traditionally regulated vertically integrated utilities, 
and as such, have had primary jurisdiction over electricity 
generation, transmission, distribution, and marketing.193 
However, not only does the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) regulate the interstate transmission of 
electricity,194 but the federal government has from time to time 
played a prominent role in setting electricity policy, such as when 
Congress passed the 1978 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act 
(requiring utilities to buy power from cogeneration sources and 
from renewable energy sources)195 and the 1992 Energy Policy 
Act, amended in 2005 (which required FERC to order the opening 
of interstate transmission lines to independent generators),196 
and when FERC actually issued the order to unbundle electricity 
services197 and open up interstate transmission lines under Order 
888 (which also mandated other requirements of utilities and 
                                                     
 190. Eric Hirst & Lester Baxter, How Stranded Will Electric Utilities Be?, PUB. UTIL. 
FORT., Feb. 15, 1995, at 30, 31. 
 191. See supra Part III.B. 
 192. Reed W. Cearley & Daniel H. Cole, Stranded Benefits Versus Stranded Costs in 
Utility Deregulation, in 7 THE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS: THE END OF A 
NATURAL MONOPOLY: DEREGULATION AND COMPETITION IN THE ELECTRIC POWER 
INDUSTRY 169, 170–72, 179, 181–82, 184–85 (Peter Z. Grossman & Daniel H. Cole eds., 
2003). 
 193. Robert J. Michaels, Electricity and Its Regulation, LIBRARY ECON. & LIBERTY 
(2008), http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/ElectricityandItsRegulation.html. 
 194. What FERC Does, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, 
https://www.ferc.gov/about/ferc-does.asp (last updated May 28, 2013). 
 195. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, § 210, 92 Stat. 
3117, 3144 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (2012)). 
 196. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, §§ 721–722, 106 Stat. 2776, 
2915–20 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 824j–824k); Bob Eleff, Federal Regulation of 
Electric Transmission: From Monopolistic Barrier to Competitive Force, RESEARCH DEP’T, 
MINN. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 5 (Dec. 2012), available at http://www.house.leg.state. 
mn.us/hrd/pubs/regelectric.pdf. 
 197. “Unbundling” means to break up the traditionally vertically integrated electric 
utilities typical of the regulated monopoly regime. See, e.g., Paul L. Joskow, California’s 
Electricity Crisis, 17 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 365, 367 (2001) (distinguishing between 
“wholesale” and “unbundled” transmission service). 
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transmission owners).198 Lobbying and lawsuits thus took place 
on both the state and federal levels. 
The unusual characteristic of the electricity deregulation 
debate was that almost all of the parties, from integrated electric 
utilities, to consumer groups, to rural electric cooperatives, 
agreed: electricity deregulation could work, if done properly 
(their way).199 The disagreement was which path would be taken. 
Electric utilities spent $5.4 million in 1992 campaign 
contributions, which increased to $9.5 million in 1996.200 Interest 
groups self-reported a conservatively estimated total of 
$50 million in contributions.201 The end result is a mixed bag: 
fifteen states, plus Washington, D.C., either fully deregulated or 
actively regulated their electricity markets, and seven have 
suspended their deregulation plans,202 including California, 
which suffered the most humiliating failures of deregulation.203 
As of 2010, the remaining states were not in the process of 
deregulating electricity at all.204 
Granted, electricity deregulation is complicated business, 
challenging the capacity of elected legislatures to comprehend. 
But given the consensus among interest groups that electricity 
deregulation is a good thing (as long as they get their way), the 
stalled nature of electricity deregulation serves as a testament to 
the power of incumbency. If there is any doubt as to the power of 
the electricity generation industry to get its way, more evidence 
can be found in the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 
2009, also known as Waxman–Markey after its House 
sponsors.205 Waxman–Markey, which passed the U.S. House of 
Representatives in 2009, would have instituted a greenhouse gas 
                                                     
 198. 18 C.F.R. § 35.28 (2013). 
 199. Electricity Deregulation, OPENSECRETS, http://www.opensecrets.org/news/issues/ 
electricity/index.php (last visited Feb. 6, 2014). 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, STATUS OF ELECTRICITY 
RESTRUCTURING BY STATE (Sept. 2010), available at http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/electricity/ 
page/restructuring/restructure_elect.html. 
 203. California electricity consumers suffered high prices and brownouts when 
electricity suppliers accumulated market power through failures of the deregulation plan 
and chose to withhold power in times of electricity shortages. See, e.g, Joskow, supra note 
197, at 377–78, 384; Peter Navarro, On the Political Economy of Electricity Deregulation—
California Style, ELECTRICITY J., March 2004, at 47, 47–49, 53 (commenting on the 
“California electricity crisis” and the mistakes leading up to it). 
 204. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 202. 
 205. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. 
(2009); HSU, supra note 7, at 120 (discussing how the Waxman-Markey Act “provided the 
disadvantaged coal industries and the utilities that burn coal with enormous payoffs in 
the form of free allowances”). 
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cap-and-trade program, allocating permits to emit greenhouse 
gases, at least initially, by simply writing the allocations into the 
bill.206 The largest recipient of freely allocated emissions permits? 
Electric utilities would have received 43.75% of the freely 
allocated allowances for 2012 and 2013, declining gradually to 
7% by 2029.207 It was no surprise that the bill had the support of 
the Edison Electric Institute, the trade association for electric 
utilities, because it was deeply involved in writing it.208 
D. Grandfathering 
Grandfathering, or more generally “transition relief,” is a 
common practice in lawmaking, especially in environmental 
lawmaking.209 Because environmental regulation can severely affect 
the value of capital, environmental laws have often exempted 
existing capital from new laws or regulations.210 Lawmakers seem 
particularly worried about negative impacts on capital.211 
The normative discussion on grandfathering has been 
largely efficiency-oriented, centering on a discussion of how to 
                                                     
 206. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, § 727. 
 207. Id. § 782(a). 
 208. EEI president Thomas Kuhn also made a number of post-passage efforts to 
support a Senate bill that would be compatible with the Waxman–Markey bill he helped 
craft. HSU, supra note 7, at 120 (illustrating the Edison Electric Institute’s partnership in 
crafting the bill); John M. Broder, Senate Gets a Climate and Energy Bill, Modified by a 
Gulf Spill That Still Grows, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2010, at A18 (“The leader of the main 
utility industry trade group, Thomas R. Kuhn of the Edison Electric Institute, stood with 
Mr. Kerry and Mr. Lieberman on Wednesday and endorsed their bill.”). 
 209. Bruce R. Huber, Transition Policy in Environmental Law, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 91, 92, 96 (2011) (noting that the distinction between new sources of pollution and 
existing sources “reflects a recurring political problem faced by makers of environmental 
policy”); Jonathan Remy Nash, Allocation and Uncertainty: Strategic Responses to 
Environmental Grandfathering, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 809, 811 (2009) (“[T]he government 
may choose to base allocations not on current activities, but on recent activities that 
predate the announced intention to implement limitations on resource access. Such 
systems have become increasingly common in the context of environmental and natural 
resource regulation.”); Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Grandfathering and 
Environmental Regulation: The Law and Economics of New Source Review, 101 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1677, 1680 (2007) (“The problem of whether and how to extend favorable treatment 
to existing sources is a recurring one in environmental law.”); Robert N. Stavins, Vintage-
Differentiated Environmental Regulation, 25 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 29, 34 (2006) 
(“[G]randfathering is likely to be a politically expedient option for legislators, since it 
allows leeway in rewarding firms and in distributing the costs and benefits of regulation 
among jurisdictions.”). 
 210. See Robertson, supra note 81, at 152, 157–58 (noting that environmental laws 
often contain grandfathering clauses which exempt existing capital from new 
regulations). 
 211. See, e.g., Huber, supra note 209, at 127 (“Both state and federal lawmakers have 
shied away from imposing the enormous costs associated with the mandatory retrofit, 
upgrade, or retirement of in-use diesel trucks . . . .”). 
Do Not Delete  2/9/2014  4:51 PM 
2014] CAPITAL RIGIDITIES 761 
allocate the “costs of legal transitions.”212 Louis Kaplow’s seminal 
An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions argued against 
grandfathering on the grounds that legal transitions are not 
sufficiently different from other changes in the economic 
environment to warrant different treatment.213 One might argue 
that in legal changes, as in market changes, it is the private 
party that is better able to anticipate change.214 The more 
compelling arguments, however, point out how a regime of 
grandfathering creates perverse incentives.215 There is obviously 
the transition relief itself, which could become the subject of rent-
seeking.216 Also, regulatory targets might, in anticipation of 
transition relief, have less incentive to anticipate very 
foreseeable legal changes, for example, as a result of emerging 
public health or safety concerns.217 Additionally, in regimes in 
which transition relief might be pegged to historical baselines, 
just a whiff of new regulation may send regulatory targets off in 
a race to boost their baselines in the hopes of securing a larger 
share of the impending transition relief.218 And finally, 
policymakers have utterly failed to appreciate that grandfather 
status confers an asset in the form of a legal exemption, which 
competitors, but not incumbents, have to observe.219 This can be 
an enormous advantage, and a barrier to entry, as new entrants 
are required to spend hundreds of millions that incumbents do 
                                                     
 212. See id. at 92 (suggesting that economists believe the crux of transition policy is 
efficiency); see also DANIEL SHAVIRO, WHEN RULES CHANGE: AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL 
ANALYSIS OF TRANSITION RELIEF AND RETROACTIVITY 221–23 (2000) (positing that delay is 
superior to grandfathering for transition relief); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of 
Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 512, 584–87 (1986) (analyzing the undesirability 
of grandfathering). 
 213. Kaplow, supra note 212, at 513, 581–82 (1986) (“As an initial hypothesis, 
government transitions warrant the same treatment as market transitions: no transition 
relief.”). 
 214. See Saul Levmore, Changes, Anticipations, and Reparations, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 
1657, 1662–65 (1999) (explaining the incentive private parties have to anticipate changes 
in the law). 
 215. See Maria Damon et al., Grandfathering 8, 10 (Ind. Univ. Sch. Pub. & Envtl. 
Affairs, Research Paper No. 2012-11-03, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2182573 (commenting on how grandfathering can “reduce economic efficiency 
and social welfare”). 
 216. Levmore, supra note 214, at 1681–82, 1698. 
 217. Nash & Revesz, supra note 209, at 1725. 
 218. See Nash, supra note 209, at 820, 822, 836–37 (discussing the negative impact 
that “first possession” can have on resources); see also Shi-Ling Hsu & James E. Wilen, 
Ecosystem Management and the 1996 Sustainable Fisheries Act, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 799, 
806–10 (1997) (describing how the fishing industry has responded to and evaded tight 
regulations). 
 219. Steven Shavell, On Optimal Legal Change, Past Behavior, and Grandfathering, 
37 J. LEGAL STUD. 37, 71, 73–75 (2008) (illustrating how grandfather status allows for 
noncompliance with the regulation). 
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not.220 This has the ironic effect of slowing capital turnover 
because abandoning the capital also means abandoning the 
valuable asset (grandfather status), thereby delaying the 
achievement of air quality benefits.221 
A number of arguments have been offered in favor of 
transition relief, but none are as general as the arguments 
against it. Expensive, iterative technologically-based pollution 
control mandates may warrant some transition relief.222 But the 
context in which transition relief is discussed is not often of such 
a clumsy command-and-control sort.223 It could also be that 
awarding transition relief is a second-best outcome, inferior to a 
policy change unaccompanied by transition relief, but better than 
the status quo.224 But government’s inability to ascertain the 
private costs and call a bluff is an invitation to rent-seeking that 
may swamp any potential private palliative benefits.225 Finally, it 
has been argued that regulatory bodies, not capital investors, are 
in a better position to anticipate new regulation.226 But to the 
extent that new regulation is meant to address changing market 
conditions and emergent harms of some product or process, it 
would seem to be capital investors, not regulatory bodies, that 
are likely to have superior information.227 It is their capital, after 
all, and in the first instance it would be capital investors 
undertaking the due diligence of vetting the soundness of their 
                                                     
 220. See Robertson, supra note 81, at 160–61, 167–69. 
 221. See, e.g., Hsu, supra note 81, at 10,096 (discussing grandfathering’s drag on 
capital turnover); John A. List, Daniel L. Millimet & W. Warren McHone, The Unintended 
Disincentive in the Clean Air Act, 4 ADVANCES ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y, no. 2, 2004, at 1, 
13–14 (finding “deleterious effects on plant-level modification decisions”); Randy A. 
Nelson, Tom Tietenberg & Michael R. Donihue, Differential Environmental Regulation: 
Effects on Electric Utility Capital Turnover and Emissions, 75 REV. ECON. & STAT. 368, 
369, 371, 373 (1993). 
 222. See Shavell, supra note 219, at 71–73 (discussing benefits and concerns of 
grandfathering as transition relief). 
 223. See Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 1991 DUKE L.J. 607, 627, 638–
39, 641, 645 (suggesting that command-and-control regulation is responsible in large part 
for regulatory failure in the United States); Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional 
Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48 STAN. L. REV. 247, 273, 297–300 (1996) 
(reasoning that command-and-control regulation can often be dysfunctional). 
 224. See Levmore, supra note 214, at 1665–66 (suggesting that to achieve policy 
change, a norm must be developed); Jonathan S. Masur & Jonathan Remy Nash, The 
Institutional Dynamics of Transition Relief, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391, 400–01 (2010) 
(explaining under what conditions transition relief may be superior to the status quo). 
 225. See Levmore, supra note 214, at 1666–68 (sharing a pessimistic view of 
transition relief). 
 226. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, The Dangers of Unbounded Commitments to Regulate 
Risk, in RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED 135, 137, 139 (Robert W. Hahn ed., 1996) 
(demonstrating why regulatory bodies are better inclined to anticipate changes). 
 227. Levmore, supra note 214, at 1657, 1659 & n.5, 1675, 1680. 
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investment. For example, there is no reason to believe that the 
Environmental Protection Agency would have any advantage in 
anticipating the environmental risks of hydraulic fracturing than 
the oil and gas companies that engage in it. 
But all of these arguments speak to behavior after the 
formation of capital. The less obvious but possibly greater 
distortion is the ex ante effect that an expectation of 
grandfathering has on capital investment decisions. A 
substantial part of the risk of new capital is the risk of 
premature obsolescence due to regulatory action, the emergence 
of superior alternatives, or some other unexpected shock.228 
Absent risk, there is no reason that investors would abstain from 
supersizing their capital investments. Insuring, even partially, 
against the risk of obsolescence by regulation biases investors 
towards larger capital investments. And all other things being 
equal, larger capital investments will inspire larger efforts to 
defend them.229 
It is thus not so much that grandfathering inhibits policy 
change because it delays compliance with updated standards of 
behavior (a common complaint from environmentalists);230 it is 
that grandfathering inhibits policy change because it emboldens 
capital investors. Armed with the knowledge that legislatures 
and agencies will only reluctantly impose new costs, capital 
investors will, from a societal point of view, overinvest. Moreover, 
the more expensive the capital, the more reluctant lawmakers 
will be to regulate it.231 
So common is the provision of at least some transition 
relief232 that regulatory targets cannot help but notice and feel at 
                                                     
 228. See David Gabel, Divestiture, Spin-Offs, and Technological Change in the 
Telecommunications Industry—A Property Rights Analysis, 3 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 75, 95–
96 (1990) (discussing premature obsolescence in the telecommunications industry). 
 229. See supra note 96 and accompanying text (discussing the rationale of investing, 
absent risk). 
 230. See, e.g., NRDC: Regulating Obesogens, ONEARTH (June 27, 2011), 
http://www.onearth.org/article/nrdc-regulating-obesogens (“When TSCA was first passed, 
over 60,000 chemicals were ‘grandfathered’ in, with no requirement for toxicity 
information to continue their production. . . . While rates of diseases linked to chemical 
exposures continue to rise, the federal system that is supposed to be protecting us is 
unable to do the job and millions of people are at risk.”); see also Natural Res. Def. Council 
v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1224, 1243 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (“NRDC attacks several elements of the 
grandfathering as too generous . . . .”). 
 231. See Huber, supra note 209, at 127 (describing how “direct and indirect 
compliance costs associated with regulatory objectives affect their structure and 
implementation”). 
 232. See Damon et al., supra note 215, at 4–5 (commenting on how grandfather 
clauses serve as exemptions from regulatory requirements and may or may not be limited 
to a certain period of time). 
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least partially insured against changes in legal rules that might 
jeopardize their capital.233 The provision of transition relief has 
been elevated to almost norm status.234 Capital investors have 
come to expect a right to extract some profits out of their capital, 
regardless of its inherent usefulness, and regardless of the social 
harms it will impose, foreseeable or not. Transition relief, based 
on a misguided intuition, has made the obsolescence of capital 
everybody’s problem. Everybody, that is, except the owners of 
obsolescent capital. 
E. Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence 
If there were a legal development that would exemplify the 
misguided bias in favor of capital, it would be the rise in 
regulatory takings jurisprudence. For approximately the last 
thirty-five years, the Supreme Court has been extremely 
interested in scrutinizing land use regulations to see if they are 
so onerous as to constitute a regulatory taking of property 
triggering a Fifth Amendment requirement of compensation.235 
The effects of this doctrinal lurch toward property rights 
protection are not obvious. But more than any other legal or 
policy phenomenon, it reveals the one-sidedness with which laws 
and legal institutions (most prominently the Supreme Court) 
have come to view capital. 
Justice Brennan’s three-factor analysis in Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v. New York City,236 still the default test for 
what constitutes a regulatory taking requiring the payment of 
compensation,237 prominently includes consideration of “the 
extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct 
                                                     
 233. See Nash & Revesz, supra note 209, at 1726 (“[W]hen the government enacts a 
new legal regime with transition relief, it sends a signal to society at large that, in 
general, changes in legal standards will not govern existing actors.”). 
 234. See Huber, supra note 209, at 98, 112 (“[F]ull grandfathering is the norm in 
land use regulation.”); Kyle D. Logue, Legal Transitions, Rational Expectations, and Legal 
Progress, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 211, 215 (2003) (noting the “legislative norm of 
applying legislative changes nominally prospectively”). 
 235. See Joseph L. Sax, Land Use Regulation: Time to Think About Fairness, 50 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 455, 457 (2010) (“[D]uring the FDR era, the Court became more 
sympathetic to regulation, only to shift again starting around 1980. In recent decades, the 
more conservative majority on the Supreme Court has shown that the Court is, again, 
quite sympathetic to the constitutional claims of property owners.”). 
 236. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). The three 
factors are: the character of the government action, the economic impact upon the 
claimant, and the interference with investment-backed expectations. Id. 
 237. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005) (“[R]egulatory takings 
challenges are governed by the standards set forth in [Penn Central].”); see also Koontz v. 
St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2604 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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investment-backed expectations.”238 Although the jurisprudence 
and the literature do not explicitly say so, investment-backed 
expectation interests are what judges think are the interests in a 
stream of benefits stemming from the exploitation of capital. In 
the numerous regulatory takings cases that followed Penn 
Central, it is obvious the extent to which courts have paid careful 
attention to what owners of capital expect.239 It is less obvious 
that courts seem to have lost sight of the social welfare of 
regulation attacked by regulatory takings litigation. 
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, perhaps the 
most prominent beachhead for property rights advocates, the 
Court squarely focused itself on the impacts on the petitioning 
landowner, finding that a South Carolina statute, in blocking 
development of a residential lot on a barrier island otherwise 
crowded with houses, effectively deprived a land developer of 
“economically viable use of the land.”240 Justice Scalia’s majority 
opinion stated that, 
[A]t the time Lucas acquired these parcels, he was not 
legally obliged to obtain a permit from the Council in 
advance of any development activity. His intention with 
respect to the lots was to do what the owners of the 
immediately adjacent parcels had already done: erect 
single-family residences. He commissioned architectural 
drawings for this purpose.241 
Quite explicitly, Justice Scalia’s opinion, as do the vast 
majority of regulatory takings cases, places the regulatory 
takings focus on the effects of regulation on the landowner.242 
Very little is said anymore about the common law police power 
that has served as the general regulatory authority for state and 
local governments for decades.243 
                                                     
 238. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124. 
 239. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Comm’n, 535 
U.S. 302, 352 (2002) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting the extent to which the duration of 
a moratorium interferes with the economically beneficial use of the land); Palazzolo v. 
Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626–27 (2001) (finding that regulations existing at the time of 
purchase are not the sole determiner of investment-backed expectations and can be 
challenged); E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 532 (1998) (holding that a requirement to 
make retroactive contributions to a fund for coal mine workers suffering from black lung 
disease frustrated petitioner’s investment-backed expectations). 
 240. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1006–09, 1016, 1031–32 (1992). 
 241. Id. at 1008 (emphasis added). 
 242. See id. at 1008–09, 1027–31 (highlighting how the Beachfront Management Act 
disturbed the petitioner’s property rights); see also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535 
U.S. at 306, 320–24; Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124–25, 136–38. 
 243. D. Benjamin Barros, The Police Power and the Takings Clause, 58 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 471, 472 (2004) (“The term ‘police power’ . . . has been ignored in contemporary 
takings jurisprudence.”). 
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In Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. United States, one of the largest 
egg producers in the United States challenged an emergency 
order by the U.S. Department of Agriculture to slaughter all of 
the chickens in three of Rose Acre’s large chicken egg farms and 
to clean and sanitize the hen houses, following a series of 
salmonella outbreaks that were all traced to the three farms.244 
Rose Acre was still allowed to sell the eggs in liquid form.245 Rose 
Acre still sued, claiming that its diminished profits constituted a 
regulatory taking.246 Astonishingly, the Court of Federal Claims 
agreed, ruling that the emergency health order did in fact 
unconstitutionally take Rose Acre’s property, awarding Rose Acre 
over $6 million in damages.247 Applying the Penn Central test, 
the court held that the order interfered with Rose Acre’s 
investment-backed expectations,248 that the economic impact 
upon Rose Acre was severe,249 and that the character of the 
government action impermissibly favored the government.250 On 
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed, but 
left intact the lower court’s application of the investment-backed 
expectations part of the test.251 Even as the court cautiously 
upheld an emergency public health measure to prevent the 
recurrence of a harm traceable to the petitioner’s farms that had 
already sickened hundreds of people,252 the court let stand the 
hopelessly one-sided part of the lower court’s opinion regarding 
the effect on petitioner’s capital.253 
One could argue (many have) that property law in particular 
has gotten carried away with thinking about rights and 
neglecting correlative duties.254 The Supreme Court has certainly 
                                                     
 244. Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 643, 646–52 (2003), rev’d, 
559 F.3d 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 935 (2010). 
 245. Id. at 647 & n.1, 648. 
 246. Id. at 653. 
 247. Id. at 670. 
 248. Id. at 659. 
 249. Id. at 658. 
 250. Id. at 659–60. 
 251. Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. United States, 559 F.3d 1260, 1265–66, 1275–76, 
1283–84 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 252. Id. at 1262–64; Brief for the United States in Opposition at 2, Rose Acre Farms, 
Inc. v. United States, 559 U.S. 935 (2010) (No. 09-342) (reporting 3,300 cases of 
salmonella during a 1986 outbreak). 
 253. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 559 F.3d at 1265–66, 1283. 
 254. See Joseph William Singer, The Ownership Society and the Takings of Property: 
Castles, Investments, and Just Obligations, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 309, 313–14 (2006) 
(suggesting an alternative model of property that “starts from the idea that owners have 
obligations as well as rights”); Laura S. Underkuffler, Tahoe’s Requiem: The Death of the 
Scalian View of Property and Justice, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 727, 729, 731–32, 752 (2004) 
(discussing how “property claims are so often . . . unavoidably reciprocal in character” and 
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done its part to tilt the inquiry in that direction. When the Court 
has addressed the harm-prevention goals of a land use 
restriction, it has scrutinized the restrictions and their 
effectiveness, taking a skeptical view of the assertions of the land 
use regulatory agencies.255 It is striking that regulatory takings 
law so consciously focuses on the welfare of capital, and not social 
welfare. Courts have been willing to expand the regulatory 
takings inquiry into a number of areas beyond land use 
regulation, including water,256 offshore oil leasing,257 
governmental contractual rights,258 and intellectual property.259 
Electric utilities, facing losses due to new competition arising 
from deregulation260 have even raised regulatory takings claims 
from de-regulation.261 At bottom, regulatory takings law has 
sought to protect the expectation interests of owners of capital.262 
This deference to capital owners on the one hand, and skepticism 
towards the regulator and the social harm on the other, is 
analogous to the one-sidedness with which we view the benefits 
and the costs of capital. The law, as we do, only seems to 
                                                     
cause courts to arbitrarily balance “reciprocal evils[] done by reciprocal actors” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 255. In Lucas, Justice Scalia, critical of Justice Blackmun’s reliance on the common 
law police power to permit harm-preventing land use restrictions, writes that 
In Justice Blackmun’s view, even with respect to regulations that deprive an 
owner of all developmental or economically beneficial land uses, the test for 
required compensation is whether the legislature has recited a harm-preventing 
justification for its action. Since such a justification can be formulated in 
practically every case, this amounts to a test of whether the legislature has a 
stupid staff. 
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1025 n.12 (1992) (emphasis added) (citation 
omitted). 
 256. Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 635 F.3d 505, 508–09, 519, 521–22 
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that a reduction in a water allocation under a state statute could 
be a regulatory taking if the allocation was reduced to fulfill trust obligations to Native 
Americans and to comply with the Endangered Species Act); Tulare Lake Basin Water 
Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 313–14, 319 (2001) (holding that reducing 
water deliveries to comply with the Endangered Species Act was a physical taking). 
 257. Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Morton, 512 F.2d 743, 746, 751 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding 
that the suspension of offshore oil drilling operations after a 1969 oil spill off the southern 
California coast, pending an environmental review, was a taking).  
 258. Stockton E. Water Dist. v. United States, 583 F.3d 1344, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(holding that a water contract right-holder could assert a regulatory takings claim for 
breach). 
 259. Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 45–46 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that 
intellectual property rights can be rights that can be the subject of a regulatory taking). 
 260. See supra Part IV.C (discussing the financial effect of deregulation on 
incumbent electricity generation firms). 
 261. Susan Rose-Ackerman & Jim Rossi, Disentangling Deregulatory Takings, 86 VA. 
L. REV. 1435, 1457 (2000) (explaining that utilities companies have made takings claims 
due to so-called “stranded costs” resulting from deregulation). 
 262. See supra note 239 and accompanying text. 
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appreciate the benefits of capital formation, and not so much the 
costs. 
All that said, a consensus seems to exist that the changes in 
regulatory takings law have been modest.263 Regulatory takings 
jurisprudence over the last thirty years has not remade the legal 
landscape for land use regulation or for regulation generally.264 
Regulatory takings law is not exhibit A for this Article’s thesis 
that capital-friendly law has created an overcapitalized economy. 
Rather, what the last three decades of regulatory takings law 
seem to show is how legal thinking reflects a desire to protect 
capital to the detriment of less tangible, more diffuse but 
potentially much more important social, economic, 
environmental, and public health interests. Moreover, Justices 
Scalia, Thomas, Roberts, and Alito, the four justices most 
inclined to uphold private property rights against governmental 
interference, may not be done.265 Regulatory takings 
jurisprudence may still yet solidify a legal bias for entrenching 
capital. 
F. The Politics of Human and Social Capital 
All of these laws and regulations confer some preferential, or 
at least special status on physical capital. But what about social 
and human capital? It is less obvious, but potentially more 
important, that law, regulations, government policy, and even 
private firms have inclinations to protect human and social 
capital. While laws do not explicitly or structurally favor human 
or social capital the way they privilege physical capital, it is clear 
that political institutions bias decisions towards preserving 
human and social capital.266 The pervasiveness of grandfathering 
is one example. Behind the desire to preserve physical capital lies 
the connected desire to preserve the jobs, know-how, and social 
networks that derive from operation of physical capital. 
                                                     
 263. See, e.g., Sax, supra note 235, at 467 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s 
regulatory takings jurisprudence is undeveloped and unhelpful as applied to general 
issues of unfairness). 
 264. See id. at 458 (noting that since the 1980s, the Supreme Court “has failed to 
provide clear guidance in regulatory takings cases”). 
 265. See, e.g., Garrett Power, Property Rights, the “Gang of Four” & the Fifth Vote: 
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection 
(U.S. Supreme Court 2010), 21 WIDENER L.J. 627, 634, 644–45 (2012) (arguing that the 
four justices inclined to uphold property rights are still casting for a fifth vote to overrule 
Penn Central). 
 266. See, e.g., GOLDIN & KATZ, supra note 56, at 198 (discussing how state laws that 
governed school districts’ fiscal responsibilities played a prominent role in increasing 
enrollment in schools by providing poorer school districts with grants to build schools and 
supplement teacher salaries). 
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Unlike physical capital, human and social capital are most 
ardently supported in the legislative branch. For communities, 
businesses, and industries that are heavily dependent upon their 
human and social capital, and for whom alternative existences 
seem remote and implausible, reform represents an existential 
threat to the owners of that capital. Elections in coal mining 
communities, for example, become single-issue elections, with 
coal jobs taking center stage.267 In the 2012 election cycle, 
campaigns in coal country states such as Virginia, Kentucky, and 
Pennsylvania focused heavily on coal, drawing a number of 
Democrats into the coal camp.268 In West Virginia, where 
President Obama is viscerally hated for his perceived hostility to 
coal,269 the President was outpolled in several large counties in 
the state’s Democratic primary by a convicted felon, still 
incarcerated in Texas.270 
Fortunately for coal-mining communities in West Virginia, 
they had the luck of being represented by former Senate majority 
leader Robert Byrd.271 In a five-decade-long career in the Senate, 
Byrd regularly championed coal-mining communities, regularly 
foiling air pollution regulation efforts: 
                                                     
 267. See, e.g., Bruce Schreiner, Grimes Defends Coal, Touts Jobs Plan for Kentucky, 
MIAMI HERALD (Jan. 16, 2014), available at www.miamiherald.com/2014/01/16/3875793/ 
grimes-defends-coal-touts-jobs.html (“Coal mining, a major industry in Kentucky, has 
emerged as a central issue in the Senate race.”); Jennifer Yachnin, Republicans Talk Up 
Coal, Keystone XL as Economic Themes Take Center Stage, GREENWIRE (Aug. 29, 2012), 
http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1059969329/print (“Republican candidate Andy 
Barr [argued that] [t]his year alone, 2,000 Kentucky miners lost their jobs because of 
overregulation and Obama’s war on coal. For every mining job lost, three additional jobs 
are threatened.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 268. Roger Alford, Chandler, Barr Spar Over Economy, Jobs, ST. J. (Oct. 30, 2012), 
available at http://www.state-journal.com/local%20news/2012/10/30/chandler-barr-spar-
over-economy-jobs (noting coal’s importance to Kentucky candidates in the 2012 U.S. 
Senate race); Josh Kurtz, 2 Democrats in Close Races Profess Strong Support for Coal in 
New TV Ads, E&E NEWS PM (Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/ 
stories/1059969935/print (“In Virginia, former Gov. Tim Kaine (D), who is locked in a 
tight open-seat race against former Sen. George Allen (R), launched an ad today in which 
he touts the help his administration gave a coal plant in southwest Virginia when he was 
governor. . . . ‘This state-of-the-art coal plant in southwest Virginia, where my wife’s from, 
created 2,500 new jobs,’ Kaine says. . . . Meanwhile, in Pennsylvania’s 12th 
District . . . Rep. Mark Critz (D) began airing an ad . . . that blisters the Obama 
administration for its environmental regulations. ‘Seven hundred coal jobs depended on 
building an air shaft at the Cumberland Mine,’ Critz says . . . ‘[b]ut we had to fight 
President Obama’s EPA to get it built.’”). 
 269. Manuel Quinones, Appalachia Fights Back Against President’s Coal Policies, 
ENV’T & ENERGY DAILY (May 10, 2012), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1059964186/print 
(referencing Obama’s low popularity ratings in West Virginia due to his “agenda to 
tighten pollution controls”). 
 270. Id. 
 271. Adam Clymer, A Pillar of the Senate, a Champion for His State, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 29, 2010, at A1. 
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Arguments have been made that costs and dislocations 
caused by the compliance requirements of this legislation 
pale in comparison to the public health benefits. But what 
will we really have accomplished if we succeed in removing 
certain pollutants from the air and at the same time level 
the economies of whole communities and regions? Is that 
progress? Is that kind of devastation not even to be 
considered here? . . . When mines are shut down, not only 
do miners and their families suffer but whole communities 
also suffer.272 
What is it about coal mine workers and their communities that 
make them so invested in a livelihood so fraught with danger and 
disease?273 Granted, culture, identity, and personal pride are at 
work. But part of the answer must also be that there is embedded 
but unpriced capital in coal mining. This not only includes the 
physical equipment for coal mining operations, but also potentially 
more importantly, a tremendous amount of social and human 
capital wrapped up in coal mining and its ancillary businesses.  
By no means is coal mining special among resource 
industries. Rural communities in many resource exploitation 
industries have found political champions that have sought to 
protect the social fabric around which their economic and 
social lives are bound. Logging communities found an ally in 
the late U.S. Senator Slade Gorton: 
That preservation law has wreaked incomprehensible 
havoc on timber families who have had to live with 
prolonged uncertainty about their futures. All indices of 
human despair have gone through the roof in these 
communities: child abuse, spousal abuse, alcohol and 
substance abuse, divorce, adolescent depression and 
suicide attempts, bankruptcies, and illness. All of these 
have been exacerbated by the terrible and unintended 
consequences of the Endangered Species Act of 1973.274 
                                                     
 272. 136 CONG. REC. 796–97 (1990) (statement of Sen. Robert Byrd). 
 273.  DIV. OF RESPIRATORY DISEASE STUDIES, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., PUB. NO. 94-120, WORK-RELATED LUNG DISEASE SURVEILLANCE REPORT 30 tbl.3-1 
(1994), available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/94-120/pdfs/94-120.pdf (identifying coal 
mining as occupation on death certificate in sixty-nine percent of pneumoconiosis-related 
deaths between 1985 and 1990); NAT’L INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH, U.S. 
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PUB. NO. 201-172, COAL MINE DUST EXPOSURES AND 
ASSOCIATED HEALTH OUTCOMES: A REVIEW OF INFORMATION PUBLISHED SINCE 1995, at 
19 figs.14–15 (2011), available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/2011-172/pdfs/2011-
172.pdf (showing age-adjusted death rates, years of potential life lost before age sixty-five, 
and mean years of potential life lost (per million) for decedents age twenty-five years or 
older in the United States between 1968 and 2006 with coal workers’ pneumoconiosis as 
the underlying cause of death). 
 274. 138 CONG. REC. 31,856 (1992) (statement of Sen. Slade Gorton). 
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And in the environmentally-minded state of Massachusetts, 
the uniformly Democratic congressional delegation has 
consistently and vigorously fought fishing limitations set by the 
National Marine Fisheries Service under the Sustainable 
Fisheries Act.275 Iconic liberal Congressman Barney Frank, who 
held a ninety-two percent favorability rating from the League of 
Conservation Voters when he retired in 2012,276 has often led the 
charge. In a 2009 letter to National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) Administrator Jane Lubchenco, Frank 
urged Dr. Lubchenco that the NOAA “must be willing to act on 
its own to ensure decisive and immediate action to implement 
revised regulations necessary to protect fishermen and fishing 
communities from unnecessary and often devastating financial 
hardship.”277 Several months later, after apparently receiving 
little mollification from Lubchenco, Frank called for her 
resignation, putatively over agency misconduct.278 Massachusetts 
Attorney General Martha Coakley, in suing NOAA last year for 
setting tight fishing limits, complained of a “callous disregard for 
the well-being of New England fishermen,” that will lead to the 
“extinction of an industry that for more than a century has been 
a part of the commercial and social fabric of New England.”279 
What these statements exemplify is a rhetorical focus on 
jobs, families, and communities. In the vernacular of this Article, 
they represent human capital and social capital, and in rural, 
resource-based economies, they represent capital in groups where 
capital is otherwise scarce. When human and social capital are 
the only assets belonging to an individual or a group, a threat to 
that capital sets up a particularly acute public choice problem—
the interests of capital owners are extremely and intensely 
                                                     
 275. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1884 (2012); Shawn Zeller, Fish Fight: The Massachusetts 
Congressional Delegation Is Usually in Sync with Environmentalists, but Not on Fishing 
Limits, COMMONWEALTH (Apr. 12, 2011), http://www.commonwealthmagazine.org/ 
Departments/Washington-Notebook/2011/Spring/Fish-fight.aspx (“[T]he Massachusetts 
representatives insist that it’s they who are in the right, defending an ancient way of life 
against rules that they believe will drive small fishermen out of business.”). 
 276. National Environmental Scorecard: Representative Barney Frank (D), LEAGUE 
OF CONSERVATION VOTERS, http://scorecard.lcv.org/moc/barney-frank (last visited Feb. 11, 
2014). 
 277. Letter from Barney Frank, Rep., U.S. House of Representatives, to Dr. Jane 
Lubchenco, Adm’r, Nat’l Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Commerce (Oct. 
26, 2009), available at http://www.savingseafood.org/images/documents/congress/10_26_ 
09_lubchenco_frank.pdf. 
 278. Matt Viser, Frank, Tierney Call on NOAA Chief’s Dismissal, BOS. GLOBE (July 
8, 2010), http://www.boston.com/news/politics/politicalintelligence/2010/07/frank_calls_on. 
html. 
 279. Petition for Judicial Review at 1–2, 6, Massachusetts v. Blank, 1-13-cv-11301 
(D. Mass. 2013), available at http://www.mass.gov/ago/docs/press/2013/1-13-cv-11301.pdf. 
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concentrated, as opposed to those that would benefit from 
environmental protection. This dependence on continued 
exploitation of capital can generate psychological effects that defy 
objective facts. Desperate owners of threatened capital will 
zealously reject notions that their practices and their capital 
have become harmful or anachronistic.280 
V. WHITHER, CAPITAL? A REFOCUS ON PUBLIC GOODS 
It is important to emphasize what this Article is not arguing. 
This Article is not arguing that the formation of capital should 
never be promoted or subsidized or that capital should never be 
protected. Public goods,281 after all, are often capital goods, and 
this Article is certainly not arguing that we should abandon 
direct government provision or funding of national defense, 
schools, parks, law enforcement, and a judiciary, all of which are 
capital goods within the working definition set out in this 
paper.282 
The conceptual difficulty is that public goods are rarely “pure,” 
in that they are perfectly nonexcludable and perfectly 
nonrivalrous.283 The question for government provision or funding 
of a given project then, is how “pure” of a public good is the project? 
There are certainly capital goods that are not purely public goods 
but may be quasi-public goods, and sufficiently possess public good 
characteristics as to warrant subsidization. Network goods, such as 
railroad lines, roads and highways, and ports all have at least some 
degree of public funding, direct or indirect.284 
                                                     
 280. See, e.g., Kimberly Morrison, Fishing Industry Fights Red Snapper Regulations, 
JACKSONVILLE BUS. J., http://www.bizjournals.com/jacksonville/stories/2009/06/01/ 
story5.html (last updated May 28, 2009) (discussing a situation where fishermen strongly 
opposed federal regulation of red snapper fishing even though an assessment showed the 
snapper were being overfished at “nine times the sustainable level”).  
 281. Public goods are nonexcludable (meaning that once they are provided, people cannot 
be excluded from enjoying them), and nonrivalous (meaning that consumption by one 
individual does not detract from consumption by another). See ROBERT CAMERON MITCHELL & 
RICHARD T. CARSON, USING SURVEYS TO VALUE PUBLIC GOODS: THE CONTINGENT VALUATION 
METHOD 1 n.1 (1989); RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, 
PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 8–9 (2d ed. 1996). 
 282. See supra Part II (defining capital as “a long-lived asset that generates a stream of 
benefits” (emphasis omitted)). 
 283. See MITCHELL & CARSON, supra note 281, at 1 n.1 (“Pure public goods are 
characterized by the conditions of non-excludability of and non-rivalry congestion between 
individuals who wish to use the good . . . . In the real world, few public goods meet these strict 
conditions . . . .”).  
 284.  See, e.g., HOUSE COMM. ON TRANSP. & INFRASTRUCTURE, IMPROVING THE 
NATION’S FREIGHT TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 
SPECIAL PANEL ON 21ST CENTURY FREIGHT TRANSPORTATION 15, 31, 37 53 (2013) 
(discussing federal funding programs for highways, harbors, airports, and railroads).  
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But one reason that legal institutions have gotten into the 
bad habit of overpromoting capital is that some capital projects 
have looked enough like public goods to warrant subsidization. 
Certain capital projects hold the promise of conferring new 
positive externalities so as to apparently justify government 
funding or some other legal mechanism to promote its 
development. So how can meritorious public good-like projects be 
distinguished from the ordinary capital projects which require no 
public support and are simply part of the overcapitalization 
problem? 
One type of misguided motivation for promoting capital is an 
apparent desire for low commodity prices. Driving energy prices 
down and keeping them low appears to have been a central part 
of American industrial policy.285 An original justification for 
subsidies was to stimulate capital investment in the oil and gas 
industries, once considered undercapitalized and immature.286 
Favorable tax rules incentivized exploration and production by 
reducing capital costs and uncertainty,287 an effort that has been 
spectacularly successful.288 Capital investment in these sectors is 
considerably higher than private investment alone would have 
achieved.289 But well past the point at which the oil and gas 
industries in the United States could be considered immature, 
and past the point at which firms were unable to diversify risks 
of failure, the subsidies persisted.290 Once the old justifications 
                                                     
 285. See Mona Hymel, The United States’ Experience with Energy-Based Tax 
Incentives: The Evidence Supporting Tax Incentives for Renewable Energy, 38 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 43, 67 (2006); see also Reforming Energy Subsidies: Summary Note, IMF, 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/subsidies/pdf/note.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2014) 
(explaining how subsidies are meant to maintain low prices for consumers); Yuki Noguchi, 
Solyndra Highlights Long History of Energy Subsidies, NPR (Nov. 16, 2011), 
http://www.npr.org/2011/11/16/142364037/solyndra-highlights-long-history-of-energy-
subsidies (describing the long history of subsidies, beginning in 1918, for the American oil 
and gas industry). 
 286. Hymel, supra note 285, at 47. 
 287. Id. 
 288. See id. at 64–65 (“The federal government’s huge investment in the petroleum 
industry . . . influenced how quickly and dramatically the United States developed into a 
fossil fuel-driven society.”); Mead, supra note 110, at 352 (“[T]ax subsidies led to increased 
capital flows into exploration . . . and production was stimulated. . . . [I]ncreased 
production led to lower oil prices and established the historic U.S. low-price policy for 
energy.”). 
 289. See Cox & Wright, supra note 110, at 188–89 (demonstrating how special tax 
provisions have increased investment in petroleum reserves); Mead, supra note 110, at 
352 (“[T]ax subsidies led to increased capital flows into exploration.”); supra text 
accompanying notes 132–33 (discussing the staggering oil and gas subsidies that spurred 
this capital investment). 
 290. Hymel, supra note 285, at 47–48 (stating that the tax subsidies persisted even 
when it was clear that the nation’s increasing demand for oil showed no signs of slowing). 
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became implausible, new justifications emerged: (i) that national 
security demanded an expansion of supply to reduce dependence 
upon unstable foreign regimes,291 and (ii) the maintenance of low 
consumer prices.292 Such ex post rationalization of continued 
subsidies is a hallmark of an overcapitalized industry addicted to 
government support. 
Promoting the formation of capital to maintain low 
commodity prices is mistaken thinking because low commodity 
prices are not a public good.293 It is true that low energy prices 
spur all kinds of economic activity that might not have occurred 
without them.294 In that sense, capital producing low energy 
prices produces substantial positive externalities. But as the last 
half-century of energy development has demonstrated, 
subsidizing fossil fuels is not the only way to produce low energy 
prices. But because of huge amounts of entrenched capital in the 
fossil fuel industries, change has been slow coming.295 
This pattern of initial government subsidization, followed by 
large capital inflows into a targeted sector, followed by a 
stubborn resistance to subsidy reform, repeats itself in a number 
of resource sectors. Agricultural subsidies in the United States 
have not only distorted markets, but they also contributed to the 
capital intensification of agriculture.296 Fisheries subsidies have 
created a larger fleet of larger fishing boats, exacerbating an 
overcapitalization problem and creating a persistent overfishing 
problem.297 Unsurprisingly, reform in these and other capital-
                                                     
 291. Id. at 68, 70. 
 292. Id. at 47–48. 
 293. See supra note 281 (defining “public goods”). 
 294. See, e.g., Hymel, supra note 285, at 67 (illustrating how low energy prices often 
encourage petroleum consumption rather than conservation); David M. Smolin, The 
Paradox of the Future in Contemporary Energy Policy: A Human Rights Analysis, 40 
CUMB. L. REV. 135, 172 (2009) (“Conventional energy policy seeks to facilitate an adequate 
supply of energy at a low price in order to facilitate economic activity and growth.”). 
 295. Hymel, supra note 285, at 67 (discussing how increased profitability in the 
petroleum industry “increased investments in petroleum exploration” but “inhibited the 
development of alternatives to fossil fuels”); see also supra Part III.A. 
 296. SUZANNE IUDICELLO, MICHAEL WEBER & ROBERT WIELAND, FISH, MARKETS, AND 
FISHERMEN: THE ECONOMICS OF OVERFISHING 60 (1999) (“[T]he key feature of subsidy 
policies is that they distort the way markets operate . . . .”); William S. Eubanks II, A 
Rotten System: Subsidizing Environmental Degradation and Poor Public Health with Our 
Nation’s Tax Dollars, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 213, 214–15 (2009) (arguing that the United 
States Farm Bill “encourages overproduction, trade distortion, and depression of world 
market prices”). 
 297. IUDICELLO, WEBER & WIELAND, supra note 296, at 60–63 (explaining how 
subsidies have led to overexploitation of marine life by encouraging the use of “technology 
that increases the capacity to exploit natural resources” and creating “oversized fishing 
fleets and . . . overfishing”). 
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heavy sectors has been virtually impossible.298 And worthy of 
note, it has not necessarily been the absolute size of the costs of 
government support that is of such great importance to the 
capital-owning resource users; it is the relative importance of 
their capital in their otherwise capital-poor environments that 
motivate them to strongly resist reform.299 
Public policy toward the formation and protection of capital 
must clearly be refocused. The allure of low commodity prices, 
resource sector development, and economic development 
generally has detracted from what should be the focus of 
government provision and subsidization: public goods. Conceding 
that distinguishing public goods or quasi-public goods from 
ordinary capital projects is difficult, I propose one guiding 
principle: public goods or quasi-public goods are often network 
goods. Roads and highways, railroad lines, telephone and 
telecommunications networks, fiber optic cables, and the Internet 
itself are all network goods.300 These goods have (or have had) the 
potential to dramatically expand commerce, by providing new 
means of transportation or communication. Network goods do not 
merely confer positive consumption externalities301 or merely 
embody complementarity with other goods,302 but rather provide 
either electronic or physical linkages among users or among 
nodes.303 Networks embody some public good aspects in that 
there are large economies of scale involved, with marginal costs 
                                                     
 298. Id. at 65, 70 (“Despite their lack of economic soundness and the demonstrable 
damage they have done to both fish populations and fishing fleets, subsidies . . . persist in 
the face of criticism. . . . Efforts to remove subsidies face tremendous political 
opposition . . . .”); Michael Pollan, You Are What You Grow, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr. 22, 
2007), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/22/magazine/22wwlnlede.t.html? 
pagewanted=all (noting that the current farm subsidy structure has been in place for the 
last few decades). 
 299. See supra Part III.B (discussing how capital owners will fight vigorously to 
protect their hoped-for stream of benefits generated by their human or social capital). 
 300. For a general description of network “industries,” see LAWRENCE J. WHITE, U.S. 
PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD NETWORK INDUSTRIES 5–8 (1999), which describes network 
industries and distinguishes between one-way and two-way networks, and Shmuel S. 
Oren & Stephen A. Smith, Critical Mass and Tariff Structure in Electronic 
Communications Markets, 12 BELL. J. ECON. 467, 467 (1981), which explains why a 
network can be considered a “public good.” 
 301. A positive consumption externality is the positive effect of additional 
consumption by others. See, e.g., Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, 
Competition and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 424 (1985). 
 302. See WHITE, supra note 300, at 2 (commenting on how “network industry” has 
“become an expansive, all-inclusive phrase that appears to embrace almost any composite 
good or service embodying complementary components”). 
 303. Id. (suggesting that in some network industries “there are physical or electronic 
linkages that create networks”). 
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declining steeply with consumption.304 Networks are also 
characterized by at least some degree of nonexcludability or some 
degree of nonrivalrous consumption.305 
I emphasize the support of network capital because the 
connectivity created by networks has the potential to deliver the 
kind of outsized economic benefits delivered by public goods. The 
opening up of channels of commerce is perhaps the most 
fundamental economic function of government.306 Commerce-
facilitating networks produce the greatest gains when they lower 
the transaction costs of meeting and exchanging for persons and 
entities that otherwise have no previous relationship and are in 
that sense “unorganized.”307 Such a network must hold out the 
promise of a fruitful exchange, so access and cost are important. 
Carol Rose, in writing about the role of navigable waterways in 
promoting commerce, has characterized such spaces as 
“inherently public” space,308 where the costs of utilization are so 
low that spontaneous, unorganized commerce can take place. 
Water-based commerce represents a vital stage in the economic 
development of almost every modern society.309 Similarly, the 
provision of railroads, roads, highways, and the Internet each 
delivered, in their own time, a crucial connectivity that opened 
up entirely new sets of possible transactions, and produced 
previously unimaginable gains from trading.310 
                                                     
 304. Id. at 8–9; Michael Hsu, An Introduction to the Pricing of Electric Power 
Transmission, 6 UTIL. POL’Y 257, 257–58 (1997). 
 305. See MITCHELL & CARSON, supra note 281, at 1 n.1. (stating that few public goods 
fully exemplify the nonexcludability and nonrivalry traits); see, e.g., Brett Frischmann, 
Privatization and Commercialization of the Internet Infrastructure: Rethinking Market 
Intervention into Government and Government Intervention into the Market, COLUM. SCI. 
& TECH. L. REV., June 2001, at 1, 25–26 (noting that the Internet is nonexcludable and 
only “sometimes rivalrous”). 
 306. See, e.g., Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and 
Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 770 (1986) (discussing “[t]he great 
commerce clause” and positing that “[t]hrough ever-expanding commerce, the nation 
becomes ever-wealthier”). 
 307. Id. at 720–21, 765 (commenting on the role of navigable waterways in promoting 
commerce). 
 308. Id. at 720–21, 772–73 (characterizing “inherently public property” as “fully 
controlled by neither government nor private agents”). 
 309. See, e.g., HOUSE COMM. ON TRANSP. & INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 284, at 27 
(“Moving people and goods over water is arguably the oldest form of transportation in 
human history. For millennia, civilizations have depended upon ships to move goods to 
support nations and economies.”). 
 310. Id. at 11–13 (illustrating, for example, how a simple tee-shirt ordered in the 
United States from overseas moves by truck and ocean vessel or aircraft before arriving in 
the United States and being sent to the customer by freight or truck). Just as an example, 
agricultural advances occurred with the expansion of crop varieties, which was made 
possible by the expansion of the railroad network. GOLDIN & KATZ, supra note 56, at 265. 
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In the energy realm, there is one capital network worth 
promoting: electricity transmission lines. The traditional 
electricity paradigm of base-load power plants belonging to a 
vertically integrated utility, operating as a regulated monopoly 
with exclusive access to a customer base, is gradually giving 
way to a deregulated, decentralized paradigm which would, in 
theory, include a variety of ways for electricity supply to meet 
demand.311 A deregulated and decentralized electricity supply 
system would include the entry of new energy sources, demand 
reduction and conservation measures, and pricing schemes 
aimed at smoothing consumption patterns, thereby reducing 
daily peak demands.312 Crucial in a shift to a new electricity 
paradigm is the opening up of electricity markets to new 
entrants, and the introduction of competition for electricity 
consumers. Indeed, publicly-funded networks such as roads, 
highways, and rail lines have benefited fossil fuel industries 
enormously by lowering the costs of transporting fossil fuels, a 
benefit that continues to afford fossil fuels an advantage over 
renewable energy sources.313 To do this, a network of 
transmission lines that was designed to deliver base-load 
power to captive consumers must be technologically and 
economically transformed.314 Care must be taken to ensure 
that network goods are instruments of competition,315 as they 
would if transmission lines reduce the cost of delivering 
electricity and make possible a greater variety of electricity 
generation sources, such as wind energy.316 Among energy 
                                                     
 311. Cearley & Cole, supra note 192, at 170. 
 312. See, e.g., id. at 170, 175–76; Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, 
Interstate Transmission Challenges for Renewable Energy: A Federalism Mismatch, 65 
VAND. L. REV. 1801, 1811 (2012) (discussing the challenges of wind power). 
 313. Alexandra B. Klass, Tax Benefits, Property Rights, and Mandates: Considering 
the Future of Government Support for Renewable Energy 28 (Univ. Minn. Law Sch., 
Research Paper No. 13-11, Feb. 22, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=222298 
(explaining how the fossil fuel industry has access to a complex level of infrastructure, 
such as pipelines, that is not available to other forms of energy like solar or wind energy). 
 314. See, e.g., Klass & Wilson, supra note 312, at 1811–12 (explaining why an 
expansion of the transmission grid will be critical in order to increase the utilization of 
wind resources). For a review of the complicated issues surrounding a revamping of the 
electric grid, see PJM, A SURVEY OF TRANSMISSION COST ALLOCATION ISSUES, METHODS, 
AND PRACTICES 3 (2010), available at http://ftp.pjm.com/~/media/documents/reports/ 
20100310-transmission-allocation-cost-web.ashx. 
 315. Severin Borenstein, James Bushnell & Steven Stoft, The Competitive Effects of 
Transmission Capacity in a Deregulated Electricity Industry, 31 RAND J. ECON. 294, 295–
98 (2000). 
 316. Wind energy is generally abundant where people are not, such that the most 
important barrier to entry for wind energy producers is access to electricity customers 
through the transmission grid. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 20% WIND ENERGY BY 
2030: INCREASING WIND ENERGY’S CONTRIBUTION TO U.S. ELECTRICITY SUPPLY 93–100 
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experts, energy stakeholders, and even among partisan 
politicians, there is broad agreement that the U.S. electricity 
transmission network dramatically needs upgrading.317 
Transmission lines have many public good aspects. Regional 
transmission organizations, or RTOs, which are charged with 
operating most of the transmission capacity in the United States, 
have become regulated utilities.318 By requiring broad access to 
both electricity consumers and suppliers, which the 2005 Energy 
Policy Act requires of RTOs,319 transmission lines are mandated 
to assume at least one public good characteristic: 
nonexcludability. Thus, the development of a cost allocation 
mechanism, another thorny problem for the development of a 
transmission policy,320 becomes necessary in order for RTOs to 
remain economically viable. 
Distinguishing capital projects worth promoting from those 
not worth promoting is territory ripe for imprecision, to be sure. 
However, some guidance on capital investments is surely better 
than the indiscriminate, all-capital-is-good mindset embodied in 
existing law and policy. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Article is the beginning of an exploration of the role of 
physical, human, and social capital in perpetuating inefficient 
behavior long after it is recognized as obsolete. If capital is 
acquired for a very specific purpose and cannot be redeployed for 
                                                     
(2008), available at http://www.20percentwind.org/20percent_wind_energy_report_revOct 
08.pdf. 
 317. ENERGY SECURITY ANALYSIS, INC., MEETING U.S. TRANSMISSION NEEDS 19 
(2005), available at http://www.eei.org/ourissues/ElectricityTransmission/Documents/ 
meeting_trans_needs.pdf; ERIC HIRST, U.S. TRANSMISSION CAPACITY: PRESENT STATUS 
AND FUTURE PROSPECTS 25 (2004), available at http://www.gc.doe.gov/sites/ 
prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/transmission_capacity.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 
NATIONAL TRANSMISSION GRID STUDY 5–7 (2002), available at 
http://certs.lbl.gov/ntgs/main-screen.pdf; Eric J. Lerner, What’s Wrong with the Electric 
Grid?, INDUSTRIAL PHYSICIST, Oct./Nov. 2003, at 8, 8. 
 318. See 16 U.S.C. § 796(27) (2012) (defining “RTO” for purposes of regulatory 
statutes). 
 319. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-58, §§ 1231, 1291, 119 Stat. 594, 955, 
984. North America’s electricity grid has been devolved to ten “regional transmission 
organizations,” which are regulated by FERC and are mandated to play the regulated role 
of an electricity transmission network. See, e.g., FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, 
REGIONAL TRANSMISSION ORGANIZATIONS MAP (2012), http://www.ferc.gov/industries/ 
electric/indus-act/rto/elec-ovr-rto-map.pdf. 
 320. Hung-Po Chao & Stephen Peck, A Market Mechanism for Electric Power 
Transmission, 10 J. REG. ECON. 25, 26, 31, 39–40 (1996); William W. Hogan, Contract 
Networks for Electric Power Transmission, 4 J. REG. ECON. 211, 214–15 (1992) (describing 
the challenges of a cost–benefit analysis when a grid is used by many relatively small 
market participants). 
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another purpose, then any shift in production methods could 
effectively “strand” that capital and render it worthless. 
Especially for mass-produced goods, such as electricity, the cost 
of capital is large relative to the units in which the benefits flow 
back to the owner of capital. Payback of capital is accomplished 
over long time horizons, and over broad populations. When 
production is undertaken with methods that involve high capital 
costs and a stream of benefits that are small and widespread—
and therefore involve a long payback—a stable pricing and 
regulatory environment becomes extremely important. A small 
change in the pricing environment amplified over its application 
to a large number of customers and transactions results in a 
potentially huge change. In such an environment, owners of 
capital can be forgiven for being a bit paranoid and obsessive 
about protecting their capital by protecting their economic and 
regulatory environment. 
This Article argues that legal rules have helped capital 
owners control their economic and regulatory environment to the 
detriment of a broader society. Misguided policy and legal 
preferences have crept into legal rules and have not only 
promoted the formation of new capital, but they also protected 
existing capital from regulatory interference. The problem is thus 
not just that government has become an insurer against 
obsolescence; it is that these legal rules insuring capital against 
obsolescence have biased the mix of capital towards obsolescence-
prone capital. The result is a self-reinforcing inefficiency that 
grows over time, exacerbating latent environmental problems 
and making them harder to address. 
This analysis takes public choice theory into new territory. A 
theory of capital introduces a new variable not previously 
considered carefully. The prominence of physical, human, and 
social capital requires explicit treatment of actors at the 
individual, firm or sub-industry levels, so as to identify incentive 
structures at a disaggregated scale. This theory of capital is an 
exposition of exactly what path-dependency means in the context 
of industry, firm, and individual behavior. A theory of capital is a 
form of institutional analysis applied to the choice sets facing 
industries, firms, and individuals that engage in harmful or 
inefficient behavior. 
